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CONSTITUTIONAL BORROWING 
Nelson Tebbe*  
Robert L. Tsai** 
Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain 
is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, argu-
ments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across 
doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice 
itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater 
theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional 
borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes 
its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, 
and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw par-
ticular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas 
migrate between fields of law associated with liberty, on the one 
hand, and equality, on the other. We finish by discussing how at-
tentiveness to borrowing may illuminate or improve prominent 
theories of constitutional lawmaking. 
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Introduction 
In the American system, areas of constitutional law are often conceptu-
alized separately—think of free speech, equal protection, separation of 
powers. Perhaps due to that tendency, a common phenomenon has gone sur-
prisingly unnoticed in the literature: constitutional borrowing. In this 
Article, we aim to bring that practice to light, showing how borrowing 
works in everyday practice and assessing its implications for American con-
stitutionalism. Our investigation, at bottom, concerns how separate bodies of 
legal knowledge are interconnected and managed.  
Consider Lawrence v. Texas,1 in which the Supreme Court ruled that a 
law criminalizing homosexual conduct violated the right to “liberty” pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause. It is possible to see in the decision an 
appropriation from the language of equality. Justice Kennedy explained:  
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for con-
duct . . . are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point 
advances both interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law 
which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma 
might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection 
reasons.
2
 
The mere existence of laws regulating homosexual conduct amounts to “an 
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public 
and in the private spheres.”3 Moreover, as Kennedy stressed, Bowers v. 
                                                                                                                      
 1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 2. Id. at 575. Toward the end of the majority opinion, the themes of respect and antistigma-
tization again populate the reasoning of the Court: “The petitioners are entitled to respect for their 
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their pri-
vate sexual conduct a crime.” Id. at 578. 
 3. Id. at 575. 
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Hardwick’s4 “continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual 
persons.”5 This is a layered response to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opin-
ion, which would have decided the case on equal protection grounds.  
It is also a prominent instance of constitutional borrowing. Despite for-
mally refusing the equality rationale, the Lawrence Court nevertheless 
appropriated the rhetoric of equality—“stigma,” “discrimination,” and “re-
spect”—to stake the claim that its liberty approach simultaneously protects 
core equality values. 
The phenomenon is not limited to the Supreme Court. Across many in-
stitutions legal actors engage in constitutional borrowing for a range of 
purposes and with complex effects, some apparent and others less obvious. 
What is interesting to us is that virtually all discussion surrounding in-
stances of borrowing has concerned the substantive appropriateness of the 
specific appropriation and not the practice itself. Borrowing is simply as-
sumed to be as legitimate as any other mode of persuasion. 
In this Article, we set out to name, organize, and evaluate the dynamics 
of constitutional borrowing. Part I defines and describes the phenomenon. 
To anticipate, constitutional borrowing is the practice of importing doc-
trines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of 
constitutional law into another for persuasive ends.6 We offer several de-
tailed examples, drawing on cases from contrasting bodies of law and time 
periods. Throughout, we hold to the view that constitutional borrowing 
comprises a set of practices that can meaningfully and profitably be ana-
lyzed together. We pay particular attention to cases in which the Court has 
traded between liberty and equality. Partly that is because several prominent 
commentators have recently advocated more aggressive use of liberty doc-
trines to effectuate what have traditionally been viewed as egalitarian 
objectives.7 Therefore, an assessment of these moves seems timely.  
Borrowing occurs throughout the law, of course. While we hope that our 
study will have wide appeal as a consequence, we focus for now on the pe-
culiar challenges of constitutional borrowing. Appropriations in this context 
can raise democratic considerations of the first order, some of which are 
particular to constitutional law.  
Part II presents a typology of constitutional borrowing, focusing on four 
everyday forms: transplantation, hedging, displacement, and corruption. 
                                                                                                                      
 4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 5. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 6. Throughout the Article, we use terms such as “borrowing,” “appropriation,” 
“cross-pollination,” “migration,” and “cross-fertilization” interchangeably. These different words 
convey the same idea and signify no added distinctions. No descriptor can perfectly capture all of 
the nuances of the phenomenon, and becoming absorbed with metaphors can distract from the 
central question of how ideas transcend imagined boundaries. See generally The Migration of 
Constitutional Ideas (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in The 
Constitution in 2020, at 93 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); Kenji Yoshino, The 
Pressure to Cover, N.Y. Times Mag., Jan. 15, 2006, at 32.  
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These forms can be distinguished based on the borrower’s motivations, the 
circumstances under which the tactic might be preferred, and the persuasive 
effects and doctrinal consequences entailed. We offer practical illustrations 
of each type, recognizing that real-world examples often blend two or more 
of them. 
Part III undertakes a considered defense of cross-pollination. On 
balance, we conclude that constitutional borrowing serves important rule-
of-law values, especially commitments to generality, participation, and 
accountability. Creating a shared repertoire of persuasive moves also 
opens up possibilities for strategic leveraging by advocates, who may seize 
opportunities to deploy a device or framework from one field of 
constitutional law in some other area. In this way, the custom of borrowing 
empowers citizens and officials alike to take governing principles 
seriously. It also promises systemic gains, not only promoting certain 
doctrines in the target domain, but also reinforcing the source idea. For all 
these reasons, and despite some real dangers, we endorse the general 
practice.  
Even though borrowing is a legitimate and widely accepted part of con-
stitutional lawmaking, it would be a mistake to leap to the conclusion that 
every act of borrowing is either valid or successful. Part IV presents four 
criteria by which a particular presentation can be evaluated: fit, transpar-
ency, completeness, and yield. This list is not exhaustive, but it offers a tool 
for organizing further critiques. Part V elaborates how the practice of impor-
tation may illuminate or improve five prominent theories: originalism, living 
constitutionalism, minimalism, redemptive constitutionalism, and popular 
constitutionalism.  
I. What Is Constitutional Borrowing? 
Our first task is to define the phenomenon of constitutional borrowing. 
Precision will allow readers to assess whether, in fact, the tendency to ap-
propriate is as pervasive as we claim. Once we settle on a working definition 
of borrowing, we will give some reasons why legal actors may be tempted 
to cross over from one legal area to another. We then will offer an example 
of strategic appropriation that also previews some of its risks. 
A. A Definition 
For some, the term constitutional borrowing will conjure an act of origi-
nal design,8 such as when drafters of a new charter insert language taken 
from another people’s governing document. In describing constitutional bor-
                                                                                                                      
 8. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional borrowing and nonborrowing, 1 
Int’l J. Const. L. 196, 197 (2003) (describing borrowing as “ ‘a case of’ a larger phenomenon: 
institutional design”); Frederick Schauer, On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 Conn. L. 
Rev. 907 (2005) (challenging both the model of the “imposed constitution” and the model of the 
“indigenous constitution”); see also infra note 15. 
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rowing, we do not mean to exclude that initial act of creativity, but we are 
more interested in the many less formal but far more prevalent aspects of 
borrowing, such as the ordinary importation of doctrine from one field of 
domestic law into another. Our goal, then, is to open everyone’s eyes to the 
practices of everyday appropriation.  
1. What do we mean by constitutional borrowing? A person engages in 
borrowing when, in the course of trying to persuade someone to adopt a 
reading of the Constitution, that person draws on one domain of constitu-
tional knowledge in order to interpret, bolster, or otherwise illuminate 
another domain.9 It is, in other words, an interpretive practice characterized 
by a deliberate effort to bridge disparate constitutional fields for persuasive 
ends. 
Notice a few features of this definition. First, it assumes that the average 
practitioner thinks of constitutional law as organized into separate, bounded, 
and coherent domains. Practicing lawyers do not commonly work with con-
stitutional law as an undifferentiated whole, but instead experience it as 
organized into discrete bodies of legal knowledge, such as free speech, sub-
stantive due process, equal protection, criminal procedure, or separation of 
powers. Either explicitly or implicitly, they accept that each of these special-
ties enjoys some degree of separateness and integrity.10 That working 
perception makes borrowing possible. It may occur, for instance, when a 
court is faced with two arguments—say, a due process claim and an equal 
protection claim—and chooses to endorse the former while drawing lan-
guage from decisions associated with the latter. Such an attempt to blur 
ideas of equality and liberty is what we perceive to be happening in Law-
rence, even though the majority opinion formally declined to find an 
equality violation. That example also illustrates an interesting tension. 
While on the one hand borrowing depends on legal boundaries, on the other 
hand it works to weaken doctrinal distinctiveness.  
A second feature of our definition is that any person with a basic under-
standing of political or legal history can engage in the practice. Although our 
examples here highlight the behavior of judges, many other constitutional 
                                                                                                                      
 9. One might object to our use of the term “borrowing,” since in ordinary usage that word 
can connote the temporary taking of an object with the intention of returning it unaltered. That is not 
always how the practice works. As we explain, a borrowed constitutional idea or mechanism may 
return (or be reused) in prior sites, sometimes with little alteration, and at other times, completely 
transformed. Nevertheless, we retain the term, mostly because of its intuitive appeal.  
 10. One could complain that Supreme Court Justices care little for doctrinal niceties and 
instead seek to assemble coalitions of their colleagues by whatever means necessary. Because bor-
rowing is not possible where boundaries are thought to be meaningless, the work of the Court 
cannot properly be called borrowing on this account. Two responses occur to us. First, we think it 
important that some Justices do not perceive their own reasoning process in such crude terms. After 
all, they do feel the need to justify instances of borrowing and they do not hesitate to critique moves 
that they think unjustifiably breach constitutional boundaries. We give numerous examples of judi-
cial defenses and critiques of borrowing throughout this Article. Second, even if we treat Supreme 
Court decisions as fraught with politics, as any serious observer must, that strategic calculations and 
horse trading happen behind closed doors is not incompatible with a broader perception that respect 
for doctrinal boundaries is essential to the rule of law. 
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actors can and often do argue across disparate areas of law, including attor-
neys, legislators, executive branch officials, political candidates, activists, 
and ordinary citizens. Wherever constitutional interpretation happens, bor-
rowing is likely to be found. 
Third, borrowing is purposive, an intentional act of creative lifting. 
Whatever else may accompany a choice to borrow, a good faith choice to do 
so entails a calculation that resorting to another body of knowledge will en-
hance the rule of law or otherwise improve the odds of a position being 
accepted by others. Once again, Lawrence offers a useful illustration. The 
Justices wished to strengthen the interpretive choice they made by insisting 
that the liberty approach actually served the cause of fair treatment pro-
moted by equality norms. In suggesting that liberty claims can enhance 
equality, they also encouraged liberty-style moves by indicating judicial 
receptivity to such forms of argument. Because a perceptive advocate will 
mimic strategies that are endorsed by authoritative decisionmakers, borrow-
ing not only legitimates a particular outcome, but it also opens up 
interpretive possibilities and activates particular grammars, while simulta-
neously dissuading other modes of argumentation. After all, any high-profile 
instance of cross-fertilization will reduce resistance to subsequent cross-
overs. 
Fourth, our definition hones in on crossover among legal domains. Now, 
of course, an important field of scholarship examines interactions between 
legal and political discourses—in fact, one of us has made a contribution to 
that literature.11 We realize that it might make conceptual sense to classify 
that sort of crossover as borrowing. Merely distinguishing between legal and 
political ways of talking is notoriously difficult. This Article brackets those 
issues and focuses attention on the migration that happens among legal 
fields. 
Fifth, for the most part we put to one side appropriations that bridge 
constitutional systems (“intersystem” borrowing), focusing instead on ones 
that span discrete fields of domestic constitutional law (“intrasystem” bor-
rowing). Although we think the concept of borrowing is capacious enough 
to include transnational migration without losing its conceptual coherence, 
and although one or two of our examples below will treat instances of inter-
systemic borrowing, we concentrate here on the more commonplace 
phenomenon of exchange between fields of domestic law. We do that chiefly 
because intrasystemic borrowing has gone largely unnoticed in the litera-
ture, while appropriations from country to country have been widely 
analyzed, both when it occurs at the stage of original drafting and when it 
takes the form of citation to foreign law. 
It is important to be precise about what does not constitute borrowing. 
Arguing from precedent within a given domain—that is, saying that an ear-
lier resolution or rule controls the outcome of a controversy at bar—could 
                                                                                                                      
 11. Robert L. Tsai, Eloquence and Reason: Creating a First Amendment Culture 
(2008). 
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not be described as such. That is true by virtue of our definition, since we 
have specified that borrowing trades among constitutional fields, whereas 
precedent works to bind courts within a field. So, for instance, when the 
Lawrence Court drew on Casey to support the proposition that “our laws and 
tradition afford constitutional protection to [certain] personal decisions,”12 
the ruling engaged in straightforward reasoning from precedent rather than 
cross-fertilization. Referring to an authoritative decision within a certain 
area therefore will not typically involve borrowing as we are using the term. 
Also excluded from the concept is the deployment of devices that so 
pervade the law that they are not unique to any particular constitutional 
field. Use of those sorts of mechanisms could not be considered borrowing. 
For instance, slippery-slope arguments are commonplace throughout the 
law. When someone makes that sort of consequentialist argument—or de-
flects it by invoking the common defense, “not while this court sits”—he or 
she is simply using a form of argument that cuts across legal areas and is 
foreign to none. That does not qualify as borrowing.  
2. How is borrowing typically resisted? It is not always easy to tell when 
borrowing happens so it helps to know what to look for. Questions of le-
gitimacy surround all exercises in constitutional borrowing because they 
involve exchanges between potentially incompatible domains of legal 
knowledge. A key to identifying an act of borrowing, therefore, lies in the 
nature of an opponent’s possible response. Often it will take the form of an 
objection that the proposed borrowing is inappropriate on the ground that 
the domains of legal knowledge should be kept apart. Even a covert instance 
of borrowing may be ferreted out by asking whether it can be plausibly re-
sisted by asserting the integrity of a domain. 
In each of the examples we analyze below, opponents of an act of ap-
propriation could have defended a boundary between constitutional 
domains, or in fact did so. Where connections were not being proposed for 
the first time, more subtle efforts of resistance to borrowing were likely to 
be found rather than outright denials that such a relationship could ever be 
possible. In lieu of claiming that the source of law was off limits entirely, an 
opponent of borrowing may have objected that the proposed idea was out-
moded, unenlightened, or nonrepresentative. Sometimes an opponent argued 
that borrowing would interfere with prior commitments or unsettle prece-
dent. Any one of these reactions could have alerted readers to an act of 
constitutional borrowing. 
3. Is borrowing a form of interpretation? Not every way of working with 
canonical texts should be subsumed within the term interpretation. Making 
that mistake could unthinkingly privilege dominant theories while obscuring 
the mechanics of more creative, more subtle, methods of creating constitu-
tional meaning. 
                                                                                                                      
 12. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
TEBBE & TSAI FINAL 2M.DOC 12/21/2009 1:26 PM 
466 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 108:459 
 
Borrowing augments formal modalities of interpretation, such as those 
arising from text, history, structure, precedent, or animating principles.13 In 
the usual course, an idea or heuristic might be borrowed, and therefore har-
nessed, in the service of one of these types of formal argument. It could be 
something as simple as asserting a profound and abiding interrelationship 
between two legal provisions not obvious from the face of the instrument.14 
Or it could be a more contested move, such as drawing upon the experience, 
laws, or precedents of another constituted people, such as the English or 
French, in staking a claim about the genesis and public meaning of a domes-
tic provision.  
Borrowing therefore has a peculiar relationship to the familiar modali-
ties of constitutional argumentation. It is neither an officially recognized 
argument nor has it ever been ruled completely out of bounds. At the same 
time, the prevalence of borrowing suggests that actors within the system 
find it invaluable. We think these two features—informality plus indispen-
sability—render it a subsidiary practice. This is a major reason why few will 
openly admit to engaging in borrowing, yet why its legitimacy generally 
goes unquestioned.  
Another way of appreciating borrowing’s mercurial place in the legal 
order is to consider its relationship to the study of constitutional law as a 
discipline. We plan to say more on this topic later. For now, notice that each 
formal method of interpretation is loosely associated with a normative the-
ory of judicial review: exegesis is linked to textualism; historical 
argumentation embodies a commitment to originalism; ethical arguments 
can be seen as a corollary to living constitutionalism, and so forth. As far as 
we can tell, no one has yet articulated a theory of constitutionalism in which 
borrowing is the engine of interpretation, much less a self-contained account 
of a constitution’s substance. Again, this suggests that while something im-
portant is happening when borrowing takes place, legal actors intuitively 
realize it is not quite accurate to call it an interpretive modality. 
In our view, the rationale for refusing to elevate borrowing to the status 
of a modality is not that borrowing is illegitimate, but that, unlike a formal 
argument, it is not necessarily tethered to any substantive commitments 
about what a constitution is or should be. A textual argument presumes that 
a constitution is in crucial respects like a contract, where the drafters’ mani-
fest intentions should be honored; a historical argument acknowledges that a 
constitution is an act of political contingency; an ethical argument takes as 
its starting point that a constitution is aspirational. Borrowing makes none of 
                                                                                                                      
 13. For works that have tried to describe, catalogue, and delimit the forms of constitutional 
argumentation, see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 
(1982), Pierre Schlag & David Skover, Tactics of Legal Reasoning (1986). 
 14. Thus, borrowing encompasses not only what Akhil Amar calls “intratextualism,” but also 
a wide range of relationships that can be asserted between text- or nontext-based sources of consti-
tutional knowledge. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999). 
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these claims, and in the refusal, proves its capacity to aid a range of substan-
tive conceptions of the Constitution. 
4. What can be borrowed? As comparativists are well aware, it is possi-
ble to borrow an entire constitution, select written provisions, or particular 
precedents or customs.15 But this is just the tip of the iceberg. If we broaden 
our perspective, it becomes possible to identify all manner of legal appro-
priations, both between different legal systems and within what we 
commonly treat as a single political order.  
In truth, any element that can reasonably be used to persuade another as 
to the authoritative meaning of the Constitution is a candidate for appropria-
tion. We do not limit ourselves to rationales or rules, as important as such 
features are to the process, but rather we include a diverse array of material 
and strategies that can be used during constitutional debate: 
* legal texts 
* frameworks 
* arguments 
* doctrinal tests 
* phrases or figures of speech 
* rationales 
* principles 
* ideas 
* cultural materials (experiences, prototypes, etc.).  
Because the sheer magnitude of appropriations is daunting, we limit our-
selves here to the American practice of constitutional borrowing. We look at 
the ways in which domestic actors work across multiple bodies of constitu-
tional knowledge for persuasive ends.  
B. Some Reasons to Borrow 
Why might a person resort to borrowing? Common reasons include an 
intention to achieve a durable synthesis of areas of law whose connections 
have been neglected; to take advantage of accumulated wisdom; to blur doc-
trinal boundaries and unsettle existing categories deliberately; or to secure a 
                                                                                                                      
 15. Leading comparative studies differ from ours because they typically focus on cross-
border appropriation of ideas, and often within a single area of constitutional law. See, e.g., Mary L. 
Dudziak, Thurgood Marshall’s Bill of Rights for Kenya, 11 Green Bag 2d 307 (2008); Epstein & 
Knight, supra note 8; Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative constitutional federalism and transnational 
judicial discourse, 2 Int’l J. Const. L. 91 (2004); Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some 
Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 640 (1999); 
Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction, 38 Law & Soc’y Rev. 389 
(2004); Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 325 (1998). 
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perceived strategic advantage in debate more generally. In fact, a borrower’s 
reasons for acting ordinarily consist of some combination of private and 
public intentions. Some motivations may be self-regarding in nature, such as 
a hope to profit personally from the success of litigation or politics; others 
will have a public cast to them, such as a desire to enhance an advocate’s or 
adjudicator’s reputation or to preserve the prerogative of a particular institu-
tion, all of which might be gained through a statesmanlike balance of 
constitutional interests. Other-regarding motivations include concern for the 
aesthetics of the law (including coherence of the law and respect for the 
sources of law), concern for how the law is perceived by those who are af-
fected by it, a more specific plan to curry favor with or allay the concerns of 
certain democratic constituencies, and so on. We will say more about these 
various motivations in the next Part, where we sort out common types of 
borrowing. 
For now, we emphasize that although a number of private and public in-
tentions may motivate an actor to participate in constitutional debate, 
borrowing is legitimate only if it is guided by a measure of public virtue. To 
minimally comply with the rule of law, the act must be underwritten by the 
advocate–adjudicator’s good faith. We describe “good faith” simply as an 
honest desire to arrive at a defensible position and enhance general under-
standing of the law.16 A borrower acts virtuously if her act of creativity is 
moved by public-spirited reasons, even when accompanied by self-regarding 
motives. Just as we presume a legislative act is reasonable unless there is 
persuasive evidence to believe otherwise, so too we presume an act of bor-
rowing is legitimate, unless there are reasons to impugn a borrower’s 
motivations.  
Whether a particular act of borrowing is successful, in that it persuades 
or becomes authoritative, however, is a different matter entirely. The success 
of a specific instance of borrowing turns on a host of factors such as fit, 
transparency, completeness, and yield—criteria we take up in due course.17 
It might be said then, that any plausible act of borrowing must take place 
under these minimal conditions: 
1. A motivated borrower with the requisite disposition who believes the 
tactic will advance his interests, as well as at least rudimentary knowl-
edge of the forms to be used. 
2. A prospective audience expected to have some knowledge of the consti-
tutional ideas involved.  
3. Two bodies of knowledge ordinarily understood as discrete, at least one 
of which is sufficiently developed that it is appealing to the borrower 
and reasonably appealing to the borrower’s audience.  
                                                                                                                      
 16. We later consider an instance of bad faith borrowing, point out how to recognize it, and 
explain why borrowing without integrity is corrosive of rule-of-law values. See infra Section II.D. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
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The study of borrowing is concerned with how these three conditions are 
satisfied and, more precisely, how constitutional actors navigate these condi-
tions in real world situations. 
C. A Few Causes for Concern 
As prevalent as the practice may be, the choice to engage in constitu-
tional borrowing, like other methods of persuasion, entails certain risks. In 
this Section, we offer an example of borrowing that not only illustrates our 
definition of the practice, but also previews some of its dangers. A fuller 
discussion of its vices and virtues appears in Part III. 
The most obvious danger is discordance. Not every legal idea is com-
patible with another—the relationships may not be intuitive, the union may 
seem forced, and the result may be a jumble rather than a useful harmoniza-
tion of existing lines of thought. Since basic rule-of-law values include 
notice and an opportunity to comport one’s behavior to the law, borrowing 
carries a risk of confusion that may have real-world ramifications.  
Second, because in the real world constitutional ideas are often associ-
ated with constituencies, borrowing often asks one group of idea holders to 
assume certain new idea relationships. Resistance may have to be overcome. 
Police officers or prosecutors might not believe they have a stake in a 
synthetic reading of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; straights may not 
feel their constitutional interests are aligned with those of gay and lesbian 
couples. If these connections are poorly managed, the result could be greater 
discord rather than accord (though some level of disputation may be a 
precondition for the germination of new ideas).  
Third, principled synthesizing can disintegrate into noncommittal com-
promising or rote copying that blurs doctrinal categories for selfish or short-
term goals. It may be tempting to gesture in the direction of another set of 
ideas merely to salve bruised feelings, validate a personal preference, or get 
past the dispute at hand by whatever means necessary. A single instance of 
careless borrowing may be forgiven or eventually forgotten, but a sustained 
pattern of misbehavior can breed cynicism about the law. It may raise 
doubts about the competence or integrity of decisionmakers or, if confusion 
reigns for too long, it may even destabilize support for one or more areas of 
law. 
Stanley v. Georgia18 presents an intriguing microstudy of borrowing’s at-
tractions and challenges. There, the Justices disallowed the prosecution of a 
man who possessed obscene materials in his home. Justice Marshall’s opin-
ion stressed (a) the permeability or limitations of one constitutional domain 
(the First Amendment), and (b) the salience and compatibility of another 
domain of knowledge (the Fourth Amendment):  
                                                                                                                      
 18. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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In this context, we do not believe that this case can be decided simply by 
citing Roth [which held obscenity unprotected]. Roth and its progeny 
certainly do mean that the [First Amendment] recognize[s] a valid 
governmental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity. But the 
assertion of that interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from all 
constitutional protections. 
. . . Moreover, in the context of this case—a prosecution for mere 
possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person’s own 
home—that right takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the 
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted 
governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.19 
That Stanley’s legal principles are a product of synthesis renders them espe-
cially malleable. As an illustration, Bowers v. Hardwick20 contained a 
controversial refusal to borrow the case. Here is how Justice White’s opinion 
explained the Justices’ decision to decline the opportunity: “Stanley did pro-
tect conduct that would not have been protected outside the home, and it 
partially prevented the enforcement of state obscenity laws; but the decision 
was firmly grounded in the First Amendment. The right pressed upon us 
here has no similar support in the text of the Constitution . . . .”21 In other 
words, although the original decision involved a harmonization of the First 
and Fourth Amendments, Bowers isolates the precedent and tries to drain it 
of persuasive power by emphasizing only the speech strand of the synthe-
sis.22 Justice White facilitates this move by arguing that the text supports one 
claim (Stanley’s speech) but not the other (Hardwick’s plea for privacy). 
Moreover, the added textual precondition for borrowing fashioned by the 
Court ignores the fact that Stanley’s own claim required interpreting the 
word “speech” to protect sexually explicit materials, just as the conclusion 
that Hardwick’s claim was nontextual required an effort to characterize it 
that way rather than as a textually grounded claim of “liberty” as that word 
is used in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23  
                                                                                                                      
 19. Id. at 563–64. 
 20. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 21. Id. at 195. 
 22. This is one of the risks of borrowing: one combination of concepts or principles can be 
disentangled or disaggregated at a different point in time. For another example, see Justice Stewart’s 
concurring opinion in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), taking apart both Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Of Griswold, he writes, 
“Although the broad language of the opinion includes a discussion of privacy, the constitutional 
protection there discovered also related to (1) marriage; (2) privacy in the home; and (3) the right to 
use contraceptives. Whatever the ratio decidendi of Griswold, it does not recognize a general inter-
est in freedom from disclosure of private information.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 608–09 (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). 
 23. At its best, such a step would say that the fact that a concept appears in the Constitution 
shows its importance to the Founding generation. At its silliest, the inquiry would devolve into 
whether or not a word or idea was mentioned by the Framers or not and accord that fact decisive 
weight. 
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The heightened privacy interests identified in Stanley have been high-
lighted to protect the receipt of certain information, including adult 
pornography, but not child pornography involving real children.24 Moreover, 
Stanley’s privacy language has been used by lawyers to resist mandatory 
union dues used for advocacy with which one disagrees,25 but not to make 
end-of-life decisions,26 use drugs for therapeutic purposes,27 or, until re-
cently, engage in consensual sodomy.28 Mostly for the better, though 
sometimes for the worse, the enhanced manipulability of Stanley has some-
thing to do with constitutional borrowing. Mixing constitutional ideas can 
lead to the selective assertion of one interest at the expense of the other. 
Sometimes the outcome is principled and logical; other times, decisions to 
borrow (or refusals to borrow) are so strained they seem outcome determi-
native.  
Such concerns aside, we think borrowing’s benefits for the rule of law 
outweigh its downsides because, among other things, the practice facilitates 
the formation of a robust constitutional culture and encourages individuals 
to take principles seriously. In Part III, we take up a defense of constitu-
tional borrowing as a general practice, while recognizing that particular 
instances may require more scrutiny. 
II. Some Types of Borrowing 
We now consider several common types of borrowing: (a) transplanta-
tion; (b) hedging; (c) displacement; and (d) corruption. These do not 
comprise the complete universe of types, but they capture much of the ac-
tion. We give examples of each form, discuss why a constitutional actor 
might resort to one or another of them, and probe some of the benefits and 
risks associated with each. Some of the instances we analyze involve bor-
rowing from liberty for equality’s sake or vice versa; others may consist of 
cross-pollination among the domains typically associated with liberty. 
                                                                                                                      
 24. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); see also Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free 
Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[W]e have held that in a variety of contexts 
‘the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.’ ” (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 
564)). Interestingly enough, Stanley has been cited favorably to protect a person who views a sexu-
ally explicit image that appears to be of a real child but turns out not to be. See Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). 
 25. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977) (“[A]t the heart of the First 
Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free 
society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the 
State.” (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565)). 
 26. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 341 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). 
 27. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 28. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
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A. Transplantation 
Perhaps the most common method of borrowing is transplantation of le-
gal ideas, in whole or piecemeal, from one context to another.29 Importing an 
idea into a new domain is tempting when the idea possesses a track record 
of success in the sense that it seems defensible, has proven useful, or, quite 
apart from its demonstrated utility, enjoys support among specialists or the 
public.30  
A prominent instance of transplantation culminated in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.31 There, use of the “undue 
burden” test heralded a newly sensitized attitude toward the competing chal-
lenges presented when a state regulates an individual’s decision to abort an 
unwanted fetus.32 That formulation replaced the more protective, but less 
elegant trimester framework fashioned by Roe v. Wade. Little attention has 
been paid to the migration of the undue-burden test. In fact, it had been se-
lectively used in liberty cases,33 but was originally deployed to determine 
when a state law interfered with Congress’s dormant power to regulate 
Commerce.34 Casey doesn’t acknowledge this lineage, but it does reference 
                                                                                                                      
 29. What we describe is a juridically mediated version of what Alan Watson has elaborated. 
See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to the Study of Comparative Law (2d 
ed. 1993). Watson’s approach has been challenged, most notably by Legrand, for understating the 
connections between law and society. Pierre Legrand, What Legal Transplants, in Adapting Legal 
Cultures 55 (D. Nelken & J. Feest eds., 2001). In using the term “transplant,” we emphasize the 
possibility of conscious adaptation of ideas, while embracing a more robust notion of legal culture. 
 30. With an original act of transplantation, the most pressing concerns that arise are fit and 
completeness (discussed at greater length in Part IV). 
 31. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Justice O’Connor employed the phrase “undue burden” in an abortion 
controversy in her concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 529–30 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), as well as in her opinions in 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting), and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 
U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 32. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), foreshadowed the shift in meaning that would be 
entailed in transplanting the undue-burden approach into the abortion context. First, Justice Powell’s 
opinion stated that although the right to privacy “protects the woman from unduly burdensome 
interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy[,] [i]t implies no 
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, 
and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.” Id. at 473–74. Powell referenced 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), for this proposition, but that opinion does not employ the 
language “undue burden.” See Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. Second, Maher declined to adopt the 
reasoning of rulings typically associated with the undue-burden test in the right-to-travel cases 
(where an undue burden usually led to the application of strict scrutiny), characterizing them as 
embodying a “penalty analysis” inapplicable to public subsidy of abortions. Id. at 474 n.8. 
Relatedly, the Justices refused to find guidance in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which 
they considered to be unique to the Religion Clauses. Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 n.8. 
 33. It has been used in the right-to-travel area. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 663–
77 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing whether a one-year welfare residence requirement 
amounts to an undue burden upon the right of interstate travel).  
 34. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“[W]e have held that [the 
Commerce] Clause . . . bars state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.”) (internal 
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election law cases for support of the proposition that even a recognized lib-
erty interest can be restricted by the states without violating the 
Constitution, concluding: “The abortion right is similar.”35  
It is worth pausing to evaluate the mechanics of the importation. First, 
adoption of the undue-burden test frequently grants discretion to the gov-
ernment that did not previously exist. The approach is unclear about whether 
an illicit motivation on the part of the state actor is important or whether the 
actual imposition on a rights bearer is all that matters. Second, in at least 
some instances, the undue burden approach has been deemed inappropriate 
for a particular setting. Jurists do not always explain why officials will be 
afforded greater discretion in some settings but not in others. Third, in many 
places the undue-burden test offers a supplementary approach to determin-
ing a violation of constitutional principle, whereas Casey made it the 
exclusive measure of a woman’s right to end her pregnancy. These conse-
quences—which together make up the transplantation’s “yield”36—are not 
always self-evident or permanent, but they are crucial to how borrowing 
ought to be assessed. 
This leads us to a further point: a choice not to transplant can itself be 
momentous.37 It may tell of methods bypassed or principles rejected, 
motivations at work, conflicts deferred, or the range of future outcomes 
constrained. District of Columbia v. Heller,38 which interpreted the Second 
Amendment to protect an individual right to keep and bear arms, illustrates 
how. Toward the end of the opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia addressed 
Justice Breyer’s dissent, which proposed a test for Second Amendment 
claims that would “ask[] whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a 
way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects 
                                                                                                                      
citations omitted); see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (articulating a 
“clearly excessive” burden test for incidental burdens on interstate commerce). 
 35. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873–74. As the Casey decision pointedly states: 
[N]ot every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement 
of that right. An example clarifies the point. We have held that not every ballot access limita-
tion amounts to an infringement of the right to vote. Rather, the States are granted substantial 
flexibility in establishing the framework within which voters choose the candidates for whom 
they wish to vote. . . . The abortion right is similar. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 36. See infra Section IV.D. 
 37. These decisions have been called “non-borrowings.” See Epstein & Knight, supra note 8. 
Kim Lane Scheppele suggests that students of political design think more broadly in “aversive” 
terms, namely, by reflecting on “the negative models that are prominent in constitution builders’ 
minds.” Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and aversive constitutionalism: The case for studying 
cross-constitutional influence through negative models, 1 Int’l J. Const. L. 296, 300 (2003). 
 38. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). For critiques of Heller, see Lawrence B. Solum, District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 923 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Second 
Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 246 (2008); Adam Winkler, Hel-
ler’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551 (2009). 
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upon other important governmental interests.”39 That proved to be too much 
for Scalia, who set about explaining why Breyer’s approach was misguided.  
The Justices’ self-conscious refusal to borrow an undue-burden or “in-
terest balancing” approach had several consequences. First, the Court’s 
resistance to balancing was intended to convey commitment. Breyer’s ap-
proach would have impermissibly empowered judges to determine “on a 
case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”40 As 
Scalia put it, “[a] constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assess-
ments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”41 Second, 
bypassing the test signaled a stronger protective position for enumerated 
rights than for implied ones. “We know of no other enumerated constitu-
tional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 
‘interest-balancing’ approach,”42 Scalia wrote. He thereby declined to protect 
the right to bear arms in the same way as a woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy. 
Instead, Heller adopted something akin to the First Amendment’s rule-
and-exception approach. Drawing heavily on free speech ideas, Scalia in-
sisted:  
We would not apply an “interest-balancing” approach to the prohibition of 
a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie. The First Amendment contains 
the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included 
exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for 
the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views. The Sec-
ond Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the very product of an 
interest-balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now con-
duct for them anew.43  
Borrowing from the First Amendment appeared to serve two persuasive 
ends in Heller: (1) enlisting popular respect for expressive rights on behalf 
of gun owners; and (2) turning the question of whether balancing occurs 
into a question of who properly balances.44 It also bolstered the Court’s re-
jection of balancing approaches drawn from other areas of constitutional 
law.  
                                                                                                                      
 39. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. Justice Breyer applied his standard to “assess the extent to 
which the District’s law burdens the interests that the Second Amendment seeks to protect,” id. at 
2861 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He “weigh[ed] needs and burdens,” id. at 2864, and concluded that the 
ordinance “burdens the Second Amendment’s primary objective little, or not at all.” Id. at 2863. He 
justified the approach by referring to other instances of more deferential approaches, including 
election law cases, procedural due process opinions, and decisions involving the speech rights of 
public employees. See id. at 2852. 
 40. Id. at 2821 (majority opinion). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. (citation omitted).  
 44. For the Heller Court, reasoning in a textualist–originalist spirit, the answer is the found-
ing generation rather than present day judges or policymakers. 
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The Court’s move in Heller was explicit, but a refusal to appropriate can 
be so subtle that it may be missed by the casual observer. In Washington v. 
Harper,45 for instance, Justice Kennedy turned aside an inmate’s liberty 
claim to be free from psychotropic drugs in the absence of judicial review. 
Justice Stevens’s dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, showed 
the path not taken: an extension of the right to “freedom of the mind” 
stressed in Stanley v. Georgia.46 For them, the Court missed an opportunity 
to adapt this language from the prior ruling: “Our whole constitutional heri-
tage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s 
minds.”47 We can envision a number of reasons why Stanley might not have 
been appealing to the majority. Perhaps they felt it better to limit the concept 
spatially, to the home, rather than extend the case to public institutions. Per-
haps this entire way of thinking was deemed improper when it came to 
incarcerated persons. Whatever the truth, Harper’s rejection of this frame-
work sub silentio involved an inobtrusive but nevertheless significant refusal 
to engage in transplantation. 
B. Hedging 
We earlier described an instance of borrowing—Lawrence—in which 
multiple rationales were available, and, having selected one rationale over 
another, the Court deliberately blurred the differences between them.48 We 
now name this particular move hedging, because it is frequently undertaken 
to reduce the risks and disadvantages of making a singular doctrinal com-
mitment. Often, hedging occurs when there is already an established (or at 
least a working) relationship between two legal domains (e.g., two clauses 
of the Constitution, related political values, and so on).  
This form of borrowing may strive to ameliorate troublesome features of 
common law decisionmaking. The problem with embracing a single ration-
ale, or textual basis, for a particular resolution is the risk of becoming overly 
constrained in the future by existing precedent (including erroneous or out-
moded decisions), by long-unexamined analytical frameworks, or by 
assumptions that turn out to be mistaken. If legal decisions were simply 
about conforming to past forms or existing expectations, there would be 
little to worry about. Yet adjudication is also about looking forward, predict-
ing whether and to what degree other social actors will conform their 
behavior to the law. In this sense, hedging provides one route for escaping 
some of the undesirable features of path-dependent adjudication. If the 
choice to endorse and explicate a liberty rationale at the moment of decision 
                                                                                                                      
 45. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). The state in question allowed such decisions to be made by medical 
experts, with some administrative review. 
 46. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 47. Harper, 494 U.S. at 238 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565). 
 48. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5 (discussing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003)). 
TEBBE & TSAI FINAL 2M.DOC 12/21/2009 1:26 PM 
476 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 108:459 
 
proves too difficult to sustain in the face of social pressure, if it meets unex-
pected circumstances, or if it winds up at a logical dead end, the basis of an 
alternative rationale has already been introduced. Because of path depend-
ence, a line of argument or idea is far easier to sustain if it has already been 
introduced into an area of law than if it is must be raised for the first time. 
Thus, the incentives of a common law system may push actors to seize the 
chance to present even incomplete renderings rather than wait for an oppor-
tunity to make a systematic presentation. 
From an institutional perspective, hedging can reflect a compromise to 
achieve consensus among members of an adjudicative body. The primary 
rationale may be the one that gains the broadest assent of decisionmakers 
within an institution; gesturing in the direction of a secondary rationale 
might well be a pragmatic solution to retain certain wavering members of a 
coalition. 
Hedging may also reflect an effort to safeguard against misjudging the 
nature and extent of social support for a decision by deliberately minimizing 
differences between rationales. This amounts to an external explanation: 
drawing on a secondary body of knowledge is useful for promoting public 
acceptance of the main rationale. Still, there may be costs. The most serious 
risk with hedging is uncertainty about the seriousness of an actor’s com-
mitment to a set of governing values and the circumstances under which 
they might be controlling. 
Embrace of a secondary set of ideas may be aimed at a subset of consti-
tutional actors rather than the public at large. As such, hedging should not be 
understood as unprincipled or frivolous commentary, but instead as sophisti-
cated signaling. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,49 a decision now known as an early and 
strong statement against racial discrimination, may have involved targeted 
signaling through borrowing. Yick Wo, one of several Chinese laundry op-
erators refused a permit by the City of San Francisco, challenged the denial 
on two grounds: (1) the city’s ordinance was unduly vague and lacked pro-
cedural safeguards; and (2) the city’s refusal to renew his permit to operate a 
laundry constituted an effort to harass or oppress him on account of race or 
national origin. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the Board’s nonre-
newal of the Chinese applicant’s permit violated the Equal Protection 
Clause since it appeared to be motivated by racial animus. Instead of resting 
on one set of virtues, the opinion by Justice Mathews careened toward the 
liberty rationale before making a sudden break for equality.  
The Yick Wo opinion went out of its way to disagree with the California 
Supreme Court as to “the real meaning of the ordinances in question.” Al-
though the state court had found it neither arbitrary nor unusual to regulate 
the laundry industry in the abstract, several devastating paragraphs charac-
terized the city ordinance as both “arbitrary” and “unusual”—conventional 
due process language:  
                                                                                                                      
 49. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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[The ordinances] seem intended to confer, and actually do confer, not a 
discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of 
each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent, not 
only as to places, but as to persons. . . . The power given to them is not 
confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is granted to 
their mere will. It is purely arbitrary, and acknowledges neither guidance 
nor restraint. . . .  
. . . .  
 . . . When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of 
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and re-
view the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that 
they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal 
and arbitrary power.50 
In a surprising turn, the Justices then declined to strike down the law on its 
face based on due process principles, and instead deemed the law unequally 
applied to the Chinese: 
[T]he cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and the facts shown 
establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular 
class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, whatever 
may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by 
the public authorities charged with their administration . . . with a mind so 
unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of 
that equal protection of the laws which is secured . . . by the broad and be-
nign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.51 
Formally, the Justices stopped short of nullifying the law and commanding 
that it be rewritten; they merely restored the complainants to their positions 
absent such discriminatory behavior. Yet their hedge toward liberty was 
strong enough that readers of Yick Wo remain uncertain as to the actual hold-
ing of the opinion—does it serve the cause of antidiscrimination, strike a 
blow for liberty, or both?52  
It is possible to understand the High Court’s flirtation with the liberty 
rationale as a stern message intended for the ears of policymakers charged 
with drafting legal instruments: in the future, craft such ordinances more 
carefully if you wish to gain the benefit of the presumption of 
constitutionality normally enjoyed by legislation. The Justices may have 
found it easier to accuse a low-level bureaucrat of racial discrimination than 
to impute animus to an entire legislative body, but they also implied that 
such lenience could not be expected in the future. The risk of insufficiently 
                                                                                                                      
 50. Id. at 366–70. 
 51. Id. at 373. 
 52. Needless to say, our reading of the case differs from that of others. See generally Gabriel 
J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1359 
(arguing that Yick Wo is little more than a treaty case). 
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cabined administrative discretion may prompt more skeptical review of 
governmental actions, especially those rhetorically discredited like the 
ordinance in Yick Wo.  
Because the actor makes an uncertain commitment to a secondary ra-
tionale (often strongly implied but not always explicated), the 
counterbalancing move is comparatively less constrained. As a result, hedg-
ing opens up a powerful way to invite further legal innovation by others 
while leaving the possibility of firmer commitments for a later date. The 
proposition that liberty can enhance equality in the long run (or vice versa), 
asserted openly in Lawrence and merely hinted at in Yick Wo, can be best 
appreciated in these terms. 
C. Displacement 
A person may engage in borrowing not with the hope of achieving a sta-
ble synthesis but rather with a goal of ensuring that the imported ideas 
eventually come to dominate prevalent ideas and restructure the relation-
ships among governing constitutional norms. We call such a project 
displacement. It differs from transplantation in terms of motivation and ef-
fects. A single transplantation is usually undertaken for short-term or 
fleeting reasons, whereas displacement fulfills transformative goals (wheth-
er ideological or institutional). 
Displacement may be a net positive for the rule of law if a body of con-
stitutional ideas has become stagnant and therefore has lost touch with 
prevailing community sentiments or experience, or if an area of law has be-
come riddled with exceptions and countermethods leading to substantial 
confusion among specialists and ordinary people. On the other hand, a pro-
ject of displacement may unsettle broadly held expectations, it could 
provoke a pushback, and it risks producing an outcome that may be no bet-
ter than what is replaced.53 Displacement can be carried out by validating an 
emerging trend, in which case the implementation costs of the tactic can be 
minimized, or by reforming still-prevalent practices and beliefs, which may 
incur exponential costs in the name of reform.  
In a number of rulings in the last two decades or so, politicians, activists, 
lawyers, and jurists have energetically drawn on equality ideas to give 
meaning to the Religion Clauses.54 These efforts have produced a dramatic 
                                                                                                                      
 53. For a comparative study of two projects of displacement in the First Amendment realm, 
one involving the civil rights movement and another involving religious conservatism, see Tsai, 
supra note 11, at 78–111. 
 54. Notions of equal dignity and respect have long been a part of the liberal tradition’s stance 
toward religion, of course. Rather than ignoring those elements, our account highlights the ambi-
tions of a monolithic equality approach. Even those who observe “the seeds of an equal protection 
analysis” in early religious liberty jurisprudence acknowledge that ideas of equality have sometimes 
been deliberately “imported” from different contexts into specific areas, with varying consequences. 
See generally Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their 
History, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 275, 277–78 (2006) (exploring language of equality in state constitutional 
provisions and early judicial decisions protecting religious liberty).  
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reordering of expectations as to the scope of rights and institutional obliga-
tions such that one could say that, for better or worse, the analytical 
frameworks and vocabulary associated with equality have largely displaced 
earlier readings of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. In several 
cases, treating religious believers differently from other social actors has 
triggered charges of “hostility,” “animus,” and even “subordination.”55 To the 
extent that equality or antidiscrimination are meant to supplant other con-
ceptions of injury, we would say that the liberty approach has been 
displaced by equality-based formulations.  
In this instance, liberty ideas have been displaced by a particular brand 
of equality, a restricted view that does not protect against laws that dispro-
portiately affect protected groups. Of course, the major move came in 
Employment Division v. Smith56 in 1990. There the Court abandoned the rule 
that had, for some thirty years, treated incidental burdens on religious prac-
tice as presumptively unconstitutional.57 Speaking for the majority, Justice 
Scalia announced that such burdens on religion would no longer be subject 
to heightened scrutiny. Although laws that purposefully targeted religious 
actors for special regulation would continue to trigger a compelling interest 
test, general laws that merely had the effect of making observance more dif-
ficult would not.58  
A footnote suggested that the Smith decision was part of a broader shift 
in the Court’s thinking. It cited Washington v. Davis,59 where the Court had 
controversially ruled that the Equal Protection Clause offered only minimal 
protection against laws or policies that, although neutral on their face, had 
the incidental effect of disadvantaging protected classes.60 For instance, a 
written employment test that happened to eliminate a disproportionate num-
ber of African Americans seeking to become police officers would no longer 
occasion any particular constitutional concern, absent further evidence that 
the test reflected a discriminatory purpose.61  
Smith ought to have counted as a turnabout, and many critics viewed it 
that way.62 But Justice Scalia framed the decision differently. He argued that 
                                                                                                                      
 55. See Tsai, supra note 11, at 100–08; see also Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1263, 1327–31 (2008). 
 56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 57. Interestingly, Sherbert v. Verner also lifted its core concept from another area of law. 
Justice Brennan looked to free speech cases for the strict scrutiny standard that was to become free 
exercise law for thirty years. See 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
438 (1963)). 
 58. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 
 59. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 60. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. 229). 
 61. Davis, 426 U.S. at 246. 
 62. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (criti-
cizing Smith explicitly); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 
57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1111 (1990). 
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it was actually the old rule that had been out of step—that it had been, in his 
words, a “constitutional anomaly.”63 From Smith onward, incidental burdens 
on free exercise would be handled just like laws that exerted a disparate ra-
cial impact. Explicitly importing the disparate impact rule from equal 
protection helped the Court portray Smith as a restoration rather than a revo-
lution.64 
Scalia tried to extend this project of displacement even further in Craw-
ford v. Marion County Election Board. There, he argued in a separate 
opinion that disparate impact claims ought to be presumptively unavailable 
in the voting rights area, just as they are in free exercise and elsewhere in 
equal protection.65 Generally applicable election regulations should not draw 
any special sort of scrutiny, he argued, even if they have the effect of impos-
ing disproportionate burdens on particular classes of voters. For Scalia, 
therefore, Indiana’s voter identification requirement was permissible not 
only because it did not impose a significant burden on a particular class of 
voters, as the majority held, but also because, even if it had placed a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a defined group, the regulation was not driven 
by a discriminatory purpose. In his words, “[a] voter complaining about [a 
nondiscriminatory election] law’s effect on him has no valid equal-
protection claim because, without proof of discriminatory intent, a generally 
applicable law with disparate impact is not unconstitutional.”66 Two others—
Justice Alito and Justice Thomas—signed on to that argument.67    
                                                                                                                      
 63. 494 U.S. at 886. 
 64. More recently, Judge Fernandez of the Ninth Circuit expressed his preference for dis-
placement in the Newdow case, a challenge to recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes 
the phrase “under God”: 
Were we to [choose among the many approaches to interpreting the Religion Clauses], the one 
that appeals most to me, the one I think to be correct, is the concept that what the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment require is neutrality; that those clauses are, in effect, an early 
kind of equal protection provision and assure that government will neither discriminate for nor 
discriminate against a religion or religions. 
Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).  
Many of those who stress theories of neutrality, equal status, or equal dignity as the primary or 
exclusive method of reading the Religion Clauses are undertaking a project of displacement. See 
generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the 
Constitution (2007); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 
43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 (1975); Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal 
Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1986). 
 65. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Admittedly, the disparate impact rule Scalia was seeking to export came from an equal 
protection decision. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). If voting rights doctrine is seen 
as a subset of equal protection, then what Scalia was advocating might not count as borrowing. On 
this reading, Scalia was simply seeking the consistent application of an idea within and throughout a 
single, undifferentiated domain of constitutional law. However, we think that reading is not the most 
plausible one. After all, voting rights law has taken on a degree of independence and specialization. 
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Importantly for our purposes, Scalia was consciously seeking to further 
his displacement project. Successfully importing the disparate impact rule 
from other areas would make the majority’s approach to voting rights look 
like a departure. According to Scalia’s story, it would “effectively turn back 
decades of equal-protection jurisprudence” for courts to consider carving 
out exemptions from election regulations for voters who are disproportion-
ately burdened by them.68 That was because “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
does not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, even when their burdens 
purportedly fall disproportionately on a protected class,” and certainly not 
when they fall on unprotected ones.69 In support of this proposition, Scalia 
now could cite not only Washington v. Davis, but also Employment Division 
v. Smith.70  
The Crawford plurality did not embrace this extension of the campaign 
against disparate impact claims. Instead, it held that even “reasonable, non-
discriminatory” voting regulations would be subject to a balancing test, 
under which a burden on the right to vote would be weighed against the 
state’s justification.71 Nevertheless, Scalia’s arguments put pressure on pro-
tections against disparate impact in the voting rights area. 
What distinguishes displacement from transplantation, in sum, are a 
borrower’s motivation and the ultimate consequences of an appropriation 
(what we call its yield). It is difficult to detect a desire to displace in a single 
controversy, because identifying a displacement requires gauging the degree 
to which an idea’s proponents favor a fundamental reordering. Within a 
deliberative body, some members may be committed to a program of 
displacement, while others could simply believe that a synthesis makes 
sense in the context of a discrete dispute but not necessarily in others. A 
strong pattern that authoritative actors establish or accept may be evidence 
of an ongoing project of transformation.72  
                                                                                                                      
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1201, 
1201–02 (1996) (arguing that voting rights law is and should be distinct from the rest of equal pro-
tection doctrine). And, for an even longer period of time, the Religion Clauses have been treated as 
relatively autonomous. To the degree that voting law is seen as distinct, Scalia can be seen as advo-
cating a species of borrowing.  
 68. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (citing both cases). Of course, the campaign to displace meaningful constitutional 
protection for disparate impact is incomplete in other ways as well. For instance, speech law is not 
completely insensitive to claims that laws burden expression, even if that is not their aim. United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (protecting incidental burdens on speech with a 
form of intermediate scrutiny). 
 71. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616. 
 72. It is easy to foreswear such ambitions, yet it may be hard to know whether to credit a 
disavowal. Specialists may be skeptical of limiting language, knowing that what was necessary to 
achieve a resolution may in fact represent an unstable alliance. It is more difficult for the average 
citizen to determine whether to take qualifying language seriously. 
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D. Corruption 
At this point, we address a darker set of motivations that can, in extreme 
situations, infect an act of borrowing: appropriation may be conducted with 
the goal of corrupting an area of law. When this happens, borrowing would 
occur not for the sake of prompting a good faith reconsideration of the tra-
jectory of the law, but instead for the purpose of confusing observers, 
insulating a matter from accountability, or rendering a doctrine unusable by 
practitioners. In each of these rare scenarios, borrowing to corrupt the law 
would constitute an expression of bad faith and should be treated as harmful 
to the rule of law. 
Our examples help to describe this type of borrowing, though none of 
them necessarily rises to the level of corruption. Justice Scalia raised the 
specter of cultural incompatibility in two disputes where he found himself 
on the losing end: once in Lawrence, and again in Roper v. Simmons.73 In 
Lawrence, he objected to reliance on the law of “foreign nations” based on 
the fact that Bowers itself was “devoid of any reliance on the views of a 
‘wider civilization.’ ”74 While Scalia referred to foreign sources as “alien 
law” in Roper, which barred the execution of juvenile offenders, most of his 
objections in both cases were directed at what he believed to be the Supreme 
Court’s lack of sincerity or consistency in drawing on external sources.75 As 
for “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should 
conform to the laws of the rest of the world”—he wrote, “[i]n fact the Court 
itself does not believe it.”76  
Yet for all his reservations,77 he did not accuse the Court of corruption in 
the sense that we have described. As in Lawrence, these and other concerns 
are better classified as questions of fit.78 If Scalia thought the Court’s incon-
sistency was driven by a desire to make the law unusable, unstable, or 
unworkable, he did not come out and say it. The closest he came was when 
                                                                                                                      
 73. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 74. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 576 (majority opinion)). For this reason, Justice Scalia deplored the majority’s “mean-
ingless dicta.” Id. He also thought the reliance on foreign sources was “[d]angerous,” however, 
because “this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.” Id. 
(quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)). 
Justice Scalia’s objections still did not represent a fundamental attack on constitutional borrowing, 
but rather concern about judicial endorsement of fleeting attitudes. His concern reappeared later, 
when he characterized reliance on Canadian law as little more than “judicial imposition” justified by 
other countries’ exercise in judicial imposition. Id. at 604. 
 75. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 624. Among other things, Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he Court has been oblivious 
to the views of other countries when deciding how to interpret our Constitution’s requirement that 
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .’ ” Id. at 625 (quoting U.S. 
Const. amend. I). The same is true, he said, when it comes to abortion. Id. 
 77. We characterize these moves as borrowing in part because the proponent is not arguing 
from precedent nor from analogy. 
 78. See infra Section IV.A. 
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he suggested that the majority opinion amounted to “the Justices’ own no-
tion of how the world ought to be, and their diktat that it shall be so 
henceforth in America.”79 We might say that the law had become corrupted 
if an appropriation muddied the doctrine in the service of raw politics or 
personal preference. Then perhaps we could conclude that an outgrowth of 
law had become untenable or unusable. But that did not appear to be 
Scalia’s primary concern.  
We would need to know more, of course, to assess a charge of corrup-
tion. Are instances of borrowing defensible on their own terms or according 
to some overarching metric?80 What does an act of appropriation yield?81 
Other factors are worth considering. The more dramatic the move and the 
more serious its doctrinal ramifications, the more red flags it may raise. The 
fact that Roper goes to great lengths to minimize, or even marginalize its 
borrowing (or at least to keep its significance unsettled) cuts against a find-
ing of corruption. So does the relative lack of novelty: it is hardly the first 
time the Supreme Court has looked to foreign or international sources, and 
there is even a basis for saying that the law of nations was originally con-
templated as a resource for federal law.82  
A more plausible case of corruption might be found in Chief Justice 
Burger’s resort to “Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards” in Bowers 
v. Hardwick.83 Never before had privacy jurisprudence turned so openly on 
the content of religious injunctions. In fact, the opposite was true: core 
precedents had abetted, in the name of privacy, an individual’s choice to 
resist efforts to inculcate religious or sectarian norms.84 Although drawing 
from natural law was once an accepted form of argumentation, the canons of 
                                                                                                                      
 79. Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He also later wrote: 
We must disregard the new reality that, to the extent our Eighth Amendment decisions consti-
tute something more than a show of hands on the current Justices’ current personal views 
about penology, they purport to be nothing more than a snapshot of American public opinion 
at a particular point in time (with the timeframes now shortened to a mere 15 years). 
Id. at 629. Here, too, the charge of corruption was no more than a passing suggestion, buried among 
other concerns about methodology. 
 80. Justice Scalia contends, “The Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider all 
these matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else it should cease putting forth foreigners’ 
views as part of the reasoned basis of its decisions.” Id. at 627. 
 81. See infra Section IV.D. 
 82. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (empowering Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies 
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations”); Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (drawing on the practices of the “civilized nations of the world” to 
interpret the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment”); The Paquete Habana, 
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and admin-
istered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending 
upon it are duly presented for their determination.”). 
 83. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 84. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (extending rationale to unmarried 
persons’ effort to resist “protection of morals”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (cit-
ing privacy concerns to aid individuals’ resistance of communal objections to contraception).  
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particular faith traditions had for generations been treated as domains sepa-
rate from secular law. In reaching for parochial standards to underpin the 
state’s police power and categorically reject Hardwick’s privacy claim, Bur-
ger introduced a new element into the ongoing dispute over the nature and 
scope of individual autonomy. The potential ramifications for constitutional 
liberty alone rendered the move noteworthy. 
Did Burger honestly believe that the legal text dovetailed with religious 
doctrine? If so, why prefer expressions of disapproval from the Hebrew Bi-
ble over exhortations from the New Testament to treat social outcasts and 
the politically vulnerable with equal respect? Again, we would need more 
information to determine whether Burger acted with integrity. One might 
ask, in comparable situations, whether the jurist reached for religious au-
thority to interpret a constitutional provision. If not, an inference might be 
drawn that he or she tried to complicate due process doctrine to foreclose a 
line of argument for an entire group of people or to express his or her private 
preferences in the guise of law. As for Bowers, the fact that natural law ap-
proaches to judicial interpretation had long been out of vogue and that no 
other member of the Court was willing to endorse his concurring opinion 
are not dispositive, though they certainly locate his approach at the margins 
of jurisprudential practices.  
III. A Defense of Borrowing  
Over time, constitutional borrowing has been deployed to various ends 
by advocates of all stripes. Yet despite that widespread acceptance, we think 
that it is necessary to demand firmer grounding for the practice. Unexam-
ined tradition or habit is no substitute for a principled defense.  
Why, then, should anyone support borrowing? One rationale is that bor-
rowing can promote certain rule-of-law values. It helps restore generality to 
the law, it creates opportunities for strategic leveraging, it may facilitate ac-
countability, and it fosters systemic strengthening. If these gains 
predominate, they provide reason enough to legitimate the practice in a con-
stitutional order.  
Borrowing does not deserve support in every circumstance, of course. It 
may occasionally do violence to the very virtues that render the practice 
defensible in most situations. We flag some general dangers here and then, 
in the next Part, we set out a framework for identifying the conditions under 
which particular instances of borrowing retain or lose their attractiveness.  
A. Generality 
Constitutional borrowing tends to promote the development, over time, 
of a general repertoire of doctrinal moves that are common to disparate ar-
eas of law. Lon Fuller once remarked that the “requirement of generality” 
was “[t]he first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the 
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governance of rules.”85 Officials, according to the generality principle, 
should apply the law rather than resolve specific disputes according to per-
sonal inclination or the demands of justice in each instance anew.86 
Borrowing encourages a type of generality that may be wholesome for a 
variety of other reasons, as well. It hinders hyperspecialization and thereby 
facilitates participation by nonexperts. And wider involvement in lawmaking 
can in turn promote democratic accountability. People who value legal con-
sistency will have greater opportunities to press decisionmakers not to 
exercise their power in patternless or idiosyncratic ways. Migration of legal 
ideas may also break down outmoded categories, heighten awareness of the 
limitations of context-specific adjudication, and encourage the search for 
commonalities.  
Perhaps most significantly, generality across areas of law can foster a 
sense of fairness among litigants—a perception that comparable cases are 
being treated comparably, even though they may fall into different doctrinal 
categories. In other words, borrowing can foster a felt sense of evenhanded-
ness by encouraging the spread of common methods and devices across 
domains of constitutional discourse.87 For reasons like these, generality has 
long been prized by those who seek to promote the rule of law.88 Yet few 
have noticed that migration among legal fields can promote that quality.  
Generality can, in turn, improve predictability.89 The intermingling of 
constitutional ideas and mechanisms can give advocates a better sense of 
                                                                                                                      
 85. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 46 (1964). 
 86. See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Law and the Exemption Strategy, 30 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1513, 1514 (2009) (describing “[a] core element (some might say the core) of the rule of law” 
and citing Fuller, supra note 85). 
 87. So, for example, a Native American peyote user whose claim is denied on the ground 
that drug laws had only an “incidental effect” on sacred practices might take comfort in the fact that 
incidental discriminatory effects could not form the basis for an equal protection claim by other 
complainants. See our discussion of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), supra text 
accompanying notes 56–61, for further explanation.  
 88. Generality is an important component of the rule-of-law tradition. Along with other 
characteristics, it is seen to distinguish rule-bound behavior from dictatorial or idiosyncratic deci-
sionmaking. See Fuller, supra note 85, at 46–49; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 215–16 
(1979); Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 93, 97 (2004); 
Greenawalt, supra note 86, at 1514–15; Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal 
Theory, 2 Ratio Juris 79, 93–94 (1989).  
When we invoke the rule of law here, we do not mean to deploy its thickest meaning, accord-
ing to which government is required to adhere to a full-fledged conception of justice. Although 
some thinkers have understood the rule of law that way, we adhere to a thinner meaning, according 
to which a regime could be at once unjust and compliant with the rule of law. Cf. Greenawalt, supra 
note 86; Waldron, supra. Constitutional borrowing is neutral as to substantive justice—it can be 
deployed independent of more rigorous requirements of legal or political morality. Moreover, we do 
not suggest that even a uniform and ubiquitous implementation of constitutional borrowing would 
be sufficient to guarantee full governmental observance of the rule of law or any one of the values 
associated with that tradition.  
 89. Greenawalt, supra note 86, at 1515 (“[Officials who observe the rule-of-law value] legal 
standards that are clear in their content and whose application to particular circumstances is (at least 
for the most part) definite. . . . [This is what scholars have] called principled predictability.” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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which forms of persuasion are likely to count, even in an unfamiliar area. 
Some might predict that borrowing would undermine predictability by pro-
moting endless possibilities. Yet its proponents would argue that the custom 
has promoted a stable range of expectations.90 Over time, they would say, 
borrowing has enabled lawyers and lawmakers to craft arguments that stand 
a greater chance of success. Borrowers assist in harmonizing domains of 
constitutional law, and improved coherence fosters a greater measure of cer-
tainty.91  
Consider the question of whether the government ought to be able to ex-
clude religious actors and entities from its support programs.92 For some, 
that issue presents a strong temptation toward inconsistency. Often the same 
people who believe that the government should not be able to selectively 
deny aid to religious groups also believe that government should be able to 
refuse to fund abortions even though it financially supports natural child-
birth.93 For them, the state ought to be prohibited from selectively defunding 
the exercise of a constitutional right in the free exercise area, even though it 
is permitted to do so when it comes to due process. Tropes that populate 
these controversies include, on the one hand, the government-as-speaker 
(facilitating state influence), and, on the other hand, the government-as-
forum-creator (working to limit government discretion). Inconsistency in the 
use of these metaphors can be flagged as a refusal to borrow—and as a 
threat to generality.  
In Locke v. Davey,94 the tension between free exercise and due process 
concepts was momentarily eased. There, the Court decided that a state could 
refuse to finance certain religious activity.95 Washington State had created a 
scholarship program that covered all proposed subjects of study, except de-
votional theology.96 In upholding the program, the Court lifted an idea from 
its due process and free speech cases, namely the notion that when the gov-
ernment is funding and managing its own program, it enjoys wide discretion 
to choose which activities to support, even if the unfunded conduct is consti-
tutionally protected. “The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct 
                                                                                                                      
 90. They might point to the spread of the disparate impact rule from equal protection to free 
exercise, see supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text, or the general application of the undue-
burden standard to liberty provisions. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 91. Any benefit to calculability would of course be a matter of degree. We have seen that 
constitutional actors may import in multifarious ways. Insofar as borrowing is indeterminate, then it 
may or may not contribute to greater predictability about the substance of law.  
 92. See generally Tebbe, supra note 55. 
 93. Id. at 1284 (citing Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions 
and Religious Schools, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 989, 989–90 (1991)). 
 94. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 95. A complicating factor, which the Davey Court stressed, was that the legislature made this 
programmatic decision to comply with Washington state’s Constitution, which had been construed 
by the state’s highest court to prohibit indirect funding of religious training. 
 96. Davey, 540 U.S. at 715. 
TEBBE & TSAI FINAL 2M.DOC 12/21/2009 1:26 PM 
February 2010] Constitutional Borrowing 487 
 
category of instruction,” Chief Justice Rehnquist explained,97 characterizing 
the issue as a matter of curricular control rather than the creation of an ex-
pressive forum.98 The Davey Court’s implicit debt to the abortion cases was 
“unmistakable,” as one prominent commentator put it.99 Here, constitutional 
borrowing arguably exerted pressure toward generality.100 
Our attention to evenness also suggests a way to appraise improper uses 
of borrowing, as we will explain further in Part IV. When jurists reference 
distant ideas not in a manner that furthers consistency across legal doctrines, 
but instead in a way that creates anomalies, damage to the rule of law can 
result. Think of Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Ten Commandments case 
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, where he argued that government 
ought to be able to publicly honor “a single Creator.”101 Allowing open ac-
knowledgment of monotheism would have meant a turnabout, he realized, 
because it would have countermanded the Supreme Court’s long-standing 
prohibition on government endorsement of religion, as well as the even 
more ancient requirement of neutrality among faiths.102 In his defense, Scalia 
pointed to other areas in which the Court had happily disturbed 
settled doctrine, specifically voting rights and criminal procedure.103 That 
revealing gesture highlighted the transformative character of what Scalia 
was trying to accomplish. For him, these other moments of judicial creativ-
ity served as prototypes for action. So although borrowing often promotes 
legal consistency, it can also highlight the damage that a move, whether ac-
complished or merely proposed, may inflict on generality in the law.  
                                                                                                                      
 97. Id. at 721. 
 98. Id. at 720 n.3. 
 99. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Comment: Theology Scholarships, 
the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 155, 176 (2004). 
 100. Of course the dissent also had an argument for consistency. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 726 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Our point, however, is that both majority and dissent were employing bor-
rowing in ways that would bolster methodological and conceptual consistency—either harmony 
with liberty-based due process cases (for the majority) or harmony with equality-based antidiscrimi-
nation ideas (in the case of the dissent).  
 101. 545 U.S. 844, 893–94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Historical practices thus demon-
strate that there is a distance between the acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment 
of a religion.”); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 102. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 (majority opinion) (“[T]he First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.” (in-
ternal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
 103. Id. at 892–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[This Court has] found unconstitutional bicameral 
state legislatures of a sort that had existed since the beginning of the Republic. . . . [T]he Court has 
not shrunk from invalidating aspects of criminal procedure and penology of similar vintage.” (citing 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005))). 
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B. Empowerment 
A related point in favor of constitutional borrowing is that the practice 
promises to foster wider participation in the maintenance of constitutional 
norms. Once a regime agrees to govern by law, it presents opportunities for 
legal actors to exploit contradictions and inconsistencies. And to the degree 
that borrowing promotes values associated with the rule of law by highlight-
ing constitutional ideas, generalizing them, and facilitating their use, it will 
also enable advocates to find creative uses for those ideas.  
In other words, borrowing may promote empowerment in several related 
ways. First, an environment in which borrowing is tolerated encourages 
constitutional actors to understand that they can—and indeed, must—take 
matters into their own hands if organizing values are to emerge and endure. 
Second, it rewards syntheses of different areas of law, thereby advancing 
holistic thinking. Third, borrowing presents advocates with a practical way 
of making connections between policy objectives and long-term interests, 
namely by leveraging one idea to develop another.  
Borrowing begets further borrowing. A robust custom of importation 
creates possibilities for constitutional actors to strategically leverage ascen-
dant concepts, techniques, or tropes for use in new domains. Because even 
one instance of borrowing lends a legal device currency beyond its original 
context, it empowers advocates to press for a second and third migration. 
Even people who find themselves regularly in opposition to the prevailing 
judicial mood nevertheless may be able to redeploy a widespread legal tech-
nique in a strategic manner. 
Perhaps the best contemporary example of empowerment is the effort of 
progressive legal scholars to deploy concepts associated with individual lib-
erty in the service of an egalitarian vision. Recently, Jack Balkin and Reva 
Siegel have warned against reliance on the tiers-of-scrutiny framework 
originally associated with equal protection; instead, they have advocated 
forms of legal argumentation drawn from the Court’s liberty jurisprudence, 
particularly its speech and due process cases.104 Protecting the ability of all 
people to pursue their divergent life plans may also ensure that all people 
enjoy the status of full citizenship.105 And protecting liberty for all can serve 
egalitarianism without generating the sort of legal backlash that can accom-
pany more transparent attempts to redistribute opportunities to subordinate 
groups.106 So these scholars have pressed legal activists to take advantage of 
the Court’s recent receptivity to liberty-oriented claims—in areas such as 
speech, criminal procedure, and due process—in the service of promoting 
                                                                                                                      
 104. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7. 
 105. See id. at 99–100. 
 106. Id. at 98. One mechanism that holds particular promise for their vision of “redemptive 
constitutionalism” is the designation of a set of fundamental interests—in travel, voting, access to 
justice, and the like—that the Court has said cannot be distributed unequally along class lines. See 
id. at 98–100. 
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the full citizenship rights of women, cultural minorities, and religious 
groups. Balkin and Siegel have also urged jurists to reconstruct the Equal 
Protection Clause by “borrow[ing]” from statutes concerning employment, 
jury service, and voting rights, the use of rebuttable presumptions of illegal-
ity for government policies that work a disparate impact on subordinated 
groups.107  
Likewise, Kenji Yoshino has drawn attention to a new sort of equal pro-
tection violation, where people are subordinated not because of their 
membership in a disfavored group, but instead because they engage in con-
duct that is particularly closely identified with the group’s distinctive 
attributes.108 So, for instance, employers sometimes disfavor not all African 
American women, but only women who wear cornrows.109 Although courts 
have not consistently protected against this sort of hybrid inequality, 
Yoshino applauds the willingness of certain courts to disallow it, and he en-
courages the migration of their ideas. When in Tennessee v. Lane the 
Supreme Court held that Congress could require states to make its court-
house’s wheelchair accessible, it framed the issue not as a matter of 
protecting a subordinate group, but instead said that all people—disabled or 
otherwise—have a due process “right of access to the courts.”110 That move 
was similar to the way the Court had, just a year earlier, struck down the 
Texas sodomy statute in Lawrence not only in order to protect a right to in-
timate sexual conduct enjoyed by all citizens, but also to protect gay and 
lesbian citizens. Yoshino applauds the liberty rationale in Lane, just as in 
Lawrence, and he encourages the further spread of that particular framework 
for understanding and deciding civil rights cases. He issues a strategic call 
for future litigants and lawyers to style their claims not in terms of equality 
for members of disfavored groups, but in the language of liberty interests 
shared by all citizens alike.111 That deployment of due process doctrine in 
the service of antisubordination could be seen as a prominent example of the 
phenomenon we are tracking. 
Constitutional borrowing is especially empowering because it is agnos-
tic to political ideology. Think, for instance, of the way that lawyers 
representing religious conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s were able to 
exploit the trope of discrimination in order to depict their clients—often 
                                                                                                                      
 107. Id. at 107. 
 108. Yoshino, supra note 7 (describing “the new discrimination”).  
 109. Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights 131–34 
(2006) (discussing Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (1981)). Cornrows are a braided 
hairstyle that is particularly closely associated with certain aspects of African American culture. 
Yoshino predicts that under this new civil rights paradigm, courts should extend protections not on 
the basis of membership in subordinate groups but instead in order to encourage the development of 
human capacities by all individuals.  
 110. 541 U.S. 509, 523, 531–33 (2004). 
 111. See Yoshino, supra note 109. Similarly, one of us has suggested that it is possible to use 
the Court’s abortion funding decisions in order to make conceptual space for the government’s re-
fusal to fund religious groups on equal terms with others. See Tebbe, supra note 55.  
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members of large religious communities—as victims of just that sort of go-
vernmental oppression.112 That rhetorical strategy contributed to decisions 
protecting the right of religious speakers to access certain public forums, 
such as school buildings after hours, on equal terms with nonreligious 
community groups.113 In this respect, the substantive and rhetorical achieve-
ments of the civil rights movement empowered later actors, who may have 
seen the world in very different terms and pursued different ideological ob-
jectives. 
Think too of how defenders of federalism have deployed the practice. A 
controversial but somewhat successful strategy has involved importing the 
language of equality into domains such as the Commerce Clause and Elev-
enth Amendment. To magnify the authority of states, advocates have taken 
to describing state interests in terms of equal “dignity,” “respect,” and even 
“trust.”114 This innovation has not only permeated discussions immediately 
before the Supreme Court,115 it has also empowered states (and states’ rights 
proponents more broadly) to surmount various doctrinal impediments to the 
cause of federalism. In sum, strategic leveraging occupies a place in the 
rule-of-law tradition because it is seen to provide limited but real protection 
against governmental caprice, and because it offers that protection to groups 
with varying commitments.  
When a state commits itself to the rule of law, it does not guarantee that 
the legal rules it adopts will be just or wise. Yet even an unjust state that 
claims to govern by law implicitly agrees to obey the rules it has itself estab-
lished, even if that will result in occasional defeats. In Jeremy Waldron’s 
words: “In an oppressive regime which does respect the rule of law, there 
will be at least some values and principles in the official culture to which the 
citizen can appeal in his complaints about injustice, and some tensions 
which he can exploit to embarrass the regime.”116 Granted, constitutional 
borrowing may promote strategic leveraging more weakly than other legal 
                                                                                                                      
 112. Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America’s Church-State Problem—And What 
We Should Do About It 206, 207–12 (2005). 
 113. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001); Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–31 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993). 
 114. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“[States] are not relegated to the 
role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, 
of sovereignty.”). More oddly, in the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause decisions, the 
Justices have emphasized a state’s right to be free from “discrimination” rather than the federal 
government’s prerogative in regulating interstate trade. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
 115. During oral arguments over whether Section Five of the Voting Rights Act is consistent 
with our constitutional design, Justice Kennedy argued that the preclearance provision offended the 
“sovereign dignity” of states, which are not “trusted” to behave when it comes to the commands of 
equality. He, and presumably others, were troubled by “this differentiation between the states.” 
Adam Liptak, Skepticism at the Court on Validity of Vote Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2009, at A16. 
See generally Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental 
“States’ Rights”, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 213 (2004).  
 116. Waldron, supra note 88, at 93–94. 
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practices. Moreover, borrowing is relatively indeterminate, since the avail-
able sources for any particular borrowing will be multifarious. Yet to the 
degree that the practice promotes values associated with the rule of law by 
generalizing constitutional ideas and making them widely available, it may 
open up opportunities for advocates to find creative uses in one context for 
methodological moves created in some other domain. In our view, constitu-
tional borrowing does more to foster such productive interactions than it 
does to shut them down. 
C. Accountability 
Under the right circumstances, borrowing also may heighten the law’s ac-
countability to the people affected by its dictates. Once a mechanism has 
become widespread and institutionally entrenched, a failure or refusal to adopt 
it becomes more visible. In other words, the migration of a stable repertoire of 
moves over several domains will make a subsequent refusal to adopt that rep-
ertoire—or the introduction of a new technique—appear anomalous rather 
than innocuous. Conversely, constitutional actors may be asked to answer for 
an affirmative act of importation, particularly when that act disturbs existing 
ways of working in a particular area. The fact that the new element hails from 
another area of constitutional law makes it more visible. Either way, the 
prevalence of borrowing can heighten the salience of certain legal moves, 
making them available for commentary and critique. There may be costs, to 
be sure—unused ideas can become unusable, and popular ideas can acquire 
undeserved priority—yet the basic intuition seems correct that borrowing can 
facilitate awareness of, and perhaps even greater vigilance over, developments 
in the law.  
Consider two instances in which the Court abandoned or neglected its 
strict scrutiny framework, and the public reactions that they drew. Both cas-
es involved the complex crossover between areas of law associated with 
liberty and equality that we have been tracking throughout this Article. And 
both show how persistent borrowing can expose a subsequent departure. 
Think first of Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court discontin-
ued heightened scrutiny of laws that incidentally burdened religious 
freedom.117 Because strict scrutiny was a familiar mechanism when Smith 
was decided, having come to free exercise law from equal protection and 
free speech cases, and because the Court had been employing that mecha-
nism for roughly three decades in its free exercise doctrine itself, the 
decision to abandon it drew attention. Outcry was heard in Congress, which 
attempted to reinstitute the strict scrutiny regime as a statutory matter. It first 
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and then, after 
that law was partially invalidated,118 Congress enacted the Religious Land 
                                                                                                                      
 117. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 118. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
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Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).119 Without question, 
Congress got involved because it disagreed with the Smith Court’s decision 
to abandon the compelling interest test, which had become widespread.120 
Roughly a dozen states similarly expressed discontent with the turnabout by 
passing state-level analogues to RFRA.121 
Think second of Lawrence, where the Court deemphasized the tradi-
tional tiers-of-scrutiny approach. The Court declined to apply the 
compelling government interest test, which had already spread from equal 
protection to domains associated more closely with liberty or autonomy, 
including due process.122 Here, too, the Court’s refusal to adopt a formal 
presumption of unconstitutionality generated considerable debate.123 We say 
this quite aside from any critique or defense of that aspect of Lawrence. Our 
object is simply to show that in an era in which constitutional borrowing is 
as customary as it is today, a refusal (or decision) to import a prevalent legal 
tool can serve a deliberative function. 
Under conditions where legal techniques can be expected to be used 
with some frequency, in sum, departures from those approaches are easier to 
spot and therefore can draw the sort of public scrutiny and dialogue that 
helps to keep the judiciary faithful to its own professional and institutional 
standards. Valuing that sort of accountability comports with the more gen-
eral rule-of-law notion that government should not act in an arbitrary 
                                                                                                                      
 119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006). For an account of the history leading up to 
RLUIPA, as well as the current state of the constitutional rules, see Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and 
the Problem of Symmetry, 56 Hastings L.J. 699, 705–11, 725–27 (2005). 
 120. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (setting out 
Congress’s finding that “in [Smith] the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the 
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion” and 
explaining that a purpose of RFRA is “to restore the compelling interest test . . . and to guarantee its 
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”). 
 121. Of course the Court itself claimed that it was in fact acting to eliminate a “constitutional 
anomaly”—the presumption of unconstitutionality for disparate impact claims. See supra Section II.C. 
On that account, it was not Smith itself that stood out, but instead the free exercise rule that had been in 
place previously. After all, as the Smith Court pointed out, disparate impact claims no longer drew strict 
scrutiny. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). Recently, Jus-
tice Scalia tried unsuccessfully to export this disparate impact rule to the area of voting rights, as well. 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  
 122. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas [sodomy] statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individ-
ual.”); see also id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has not subjected the Texas 
sodomy law to strict scrutiny, and chiding the majority for applying “an unheard-of form of rational-
basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case”).  
 123. The dominant reaction was not chiefly disapproval, as with Smith, but instead a more even-
handed sort of interest. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. 
Texas, 2002–2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 21; Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 
1103 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1447 (2004); Cass R. 
Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 27; Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893 (2004). 
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manner.
124
 Now holding the judiciary to its own standards is not the same 
thing as making it accountable to public opinion in the manner that politi-
cians are. Justices may well continue to buck public sentiment, as they did 
in Smith, but they will do so with fuller awareness of the possible cost to the 
Court’s legitimacy.  
D. Reinforcement 
So far we have been discussing the benefits of borrowing by focusing on 
the borrower and persons directly affected by official action. But there may 
be other beneficial effects as well. Specifically, an act of appropriation can 
not only shore up the target area of law, but also can work to legitimate or 
reinforce the legal source. Consequently, and perhaps most importantly, a 
culture of borrowing can strengthen the constitutional system as a whole. In 
other words, when a constitutional actor lifts a mechanism from domain X 
for use in domain Y that act may not only bolster domain Y in the intended 
way, but might also enhance the credibility of the mechanism within domain 
X, as well as the credibility of domain X as a whole. When that happens, 
borrowing can also have systemic effects because the wider network of 
foundational ideas may be reinforced. That can not only stabilize the do-
mains of substantive law immediately involved—X and Y—but it can also 
bring somewhat greater coherence to legal discourses more generally. Of 
course systemic reinforcement is not necessary or automatic in all cases, nor 
is it invariably good, but it is an interesting consequence of many such ex-
changes.  
Something like that happened in Lawrence. There the Court looked to 
substantive due process decisions in order to protect intimate conduct, par-
ticularly within the home. That move worked to legitimate the right of 
intimate conduct and association developed in cases like Griswold v. Con-
necticut,125 Eisenstadt v. Baird,126 and especially Roe v. Wade127 and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.128 Those cases had been 
under sustained attack, and their logic and vitality had been threatened by 
Bowers v. Hardwick,129 by the time the Court turned to the Texas sodomy 
law. Moreover, the Lawrence Court went the additional step of appropriating 
from the domain of equality. In the process of reinforcing Y, they also 
thereby legitimated X in the form of antidiscrimination rationales and the 
                                                                                                                      
 124. Tamanaha, supra note 88, at 95; Greenawalt, supra note 86, at 1514. 
 125. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 126. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 128. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 129. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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decision of Romer v. Evans,130 even without directly saying so. This dynamic 
of mutual reinforcement should not be understated. And in that particular 
context, the move put added pressure on earlier statements of the Court that 
sexual orientation could not define a suspect class. 
Think too of the migration of the disparate impact rule from Washington 
v. Davis131 and equal protection to Employment Division v. Smith132 and free 
exercise. That appropriation likewise not only justified a rewriting of free 
exercise law—enabling the Court to characterize the old rule as “a constitu-
tional anomaly”133—but also shored up an approach to equal protection that 
has seen its share of high-profile criticism.134 To the degree that the Court 
could proliferate the idea that a presumption of unconstitutionality should 
only follow a showing of discriminatory treatment, it could more convinc-
ingly describe the old disparate impact approach as a “constitutional 
anomaly.”135  
Whether or not one approves of the Court’s decision in either of these 
examples, the point is this: when constitutional actors engage in borrowing, 
they may fortify not only the area of law into which the idea is imported, but 
also the legal source. So the Lawrence Court strengthened the principle of 
equal dignity when it brought that idea to bear on the problem of intimate 
association, and the Smith Court lent additional credence to its rejection of 
disparate impact claims in equal protection when it extended that refusal to 
free exercise. What is more, the strengthening impacts the system of consti-
tutional mechanisms more generally. There is a ripple effect of mutual 
reinforcements across constitutional law as a whole. People come to see the 
field as united by a common interpretive focus, of course—the text of the 
Constitution—but also by an interlocking set of techniques, ideas, sources, 
and mechanisms.  
IV. Criteria for Evaluation 
Now that we have a sense of some of the forms that constitutional bor-
rowing can take, as well as an appreciation of its virtues, it becomes 
                                                                                                                      
 130. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, the Court relied on an equal protection rationale to strike 
down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited special protections in state and 
local laws against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. 
 131. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 132. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 133. Id. at 886. 
 134. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1137–38 (1997) (articulating a sustained 
critique of the rule of Davis). Congress too has adopted the disparate impact approach in several 
statutes, despite the Court’s critique of that rule in its equal protection cases. See, e.g., Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–(k)(1)(A) (2006).  
 135. One could imagine, for instance, an imminent attack on the O’Brien test, which applies 
heightened scrutiny to laws that incidentally burden speech. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 376–77 (1968). 
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possible to construct a framework for evaluating incidences of borrowing.136 
Below we explicate four evaluative tools: (a) fit; (b) transparency; (c) com-
pleteness; and (d) yield. These criteria implement basic assumptions about 
the rule of law. First, the notion of fit complies with the sense that the law’s 
substance (including borrowed material) should be compatible with existing 
arrangements. Second, a preference for transparency endorses the expecta-
tion that arguments appeal to reason and further a public purpose. Third, 
completeness is related to substantive fidelity and deliberative values, neces-
sary features of a purposively designed legal system. Fourth, the idea of 
yield acknowledges that above all, the rule of law must solve problems of 
practical governance (and therefore, an act of borrowing must not frustrate 
self-rule but aid it in some fashion). 
Once borrowing is understood as a presumptively legitimate practice—a 
general acceptance that the previous Part tried to promote—most concerns 
that arise have to do with how well particular legal ideas fit together; how 
open and notorious the borrowing is; what is lifted and what is left behind; 
and what, as a practical matter, that creative act yields. 
A. Fit 
Questions of fit arise with greatest urgency when one engages in an 
original act of transplantation, but subsidiary concerns about fit can also 
linger even when two domains are already associated in the public imagina-
tion or treated as entwined in legal practice. How well different bodies of 
constitutional knowledge fit together turns on a number of factors, includ-
ing: (1) whether linkages between the areas already exist (synergy), and the 
duration of any connections (novelty); (2) what the justifications for the ap-
propriation are and how readily they might be embraced by specialists and 
average citizens (persuasiveness); (3) how the synthesized values are applied 
to the dispute at hand (practical yield); and (4) whether and how other back-
ground conditions underlie a combination of ideas (resource constraints, 
social environment, and the like). 
In Roper v. Simmons,137 the Supreme Court declared the execution of ju-
veniles to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Kennedy devoted a separate section to the experience of the United 
Kingdom, as well as Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which bars capital punishment for crimes committed 
while a person is under the age of eighteen.138 Anticipating concerns of fit, 
                                                                                                                      
 136. Bear in mind that such evaluative criteria should be used in conjunction with more tradi-
tional means of assessing legal justifications rather than replacing them. What we offer are methods 
of reaching normative judgments about the quality of borrowing to supplement existing methods for 
assessing an interpretation of the Constitution. 
 137. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 138. Id. at 576–78. The fact that the United States has not ratified the Convention did not 
stand in the way of the Roper Court’s calibrated appropriation of that legal source to bolster its 
Eighth Amendment rationale. This is because the Court gave great weight to the fact that “every 
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Kennedy pursued a four-fold response. First, he emphasized a shared Anglo-
American heritage: “The United Kingdom’s experience bears particular re-
levance here in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light of 
the Eighth Amendment’s own origins[,]” namely, the English Declaration of 
Rights of 1689.139 Second, he suggested that certain constitutional provi-
sions, such as the Eighth Amendment, contemplate borrowing, particularly 
if judicial tradition has already ratified such an approach.140 Third, he relied 
on the decisive weight of world opinion. Repeatedly, Kennedy stressed the 
“historic ties”141 and overlap between the “affirmation of certain fundamen-
tal rights by other nations and peoples” and “the centrality of those same 
rights within our own heritage of freedom.”142 Fourth, he softened any pre-
cedential effect of the borrowing by indicating that such extraneous sources 
are “not . . . controlling.”143 Recognition of interconnected traditions among 
democratic nations, Kennedy argued, “does not lessen our fidelity to the 
Constitution or our pride in its origins.”144  
Justice Scalia took aim at the Roper majority, focusing on questions of 
fit. He attacked “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American 
law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world.”145 First, he sug-
gested that appropriation should be rejected out of hand for lack of sincerity 
or consistency. On numerous occasions, Scalia pointed out, the High Court 
has expressly gone against the grain of world opinion in establishing some 
constitutional standard.146 He pointed to the First Amendment as an example 
of an area where the Court has been “oblivious to the views of other coun-
tries.”147 Having argued for the distinctiveness of American legal culture, he 
then disputed whether it made sense to infuse American law with English 
law, in light of “the United Kingdom’s recent submission to the jurispru-
                                                                                                                      
country in the world has ratified [the Convention] save for the United States and Somalia,” and no 
country ratifying the instrument has entered a reservation with respect to the prohibition on juvenile 
executions. Id. at 576. 
 139. Id. at 577. 
 140. Id. at 575 (“[A]t least from the time of the Court’s decision in [Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86 (1958)], the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as 
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual pun-
ishments.’ ”). Justice O’Connor, who dissented on the ground that no national consensus could be 
discerned against capital punishment for juveniles, nevertheless agreed that “the special character of 
the Eighth Amendment, which . . . draws its meaning directly from the maturing values of civilized 
society[,]” justifies consideration of foreign and international sources. Id. at 604–05 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 577 (majority opinion). 
 142. Id. at 578. 
 143. Id. at 575. 
 144. Id. at 578. 
 145. Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 146. See id. at 624–26. 
 147. Id. at 625. 
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dence of European courts dominated by continental jurists—a legal, politi-
cal, and social culture quite different from our own.”148 
Scalia’s objections are best classified as arguments about fit, for he im-
plicitly acknowledged the permeability, at some level, of all legal systems. 
Justices in the majority and the dissent assumed the legitimacy of borrowing 
as a practice. They simply disagreed about whether the tool should be used 
in the case at bar. Some of the dispute had to do with the consequences of 
borrowing: Scalia believed that it was being deployed “to set aside [a] cen-
turies-old American practice” and might lead to the displacement of 
American law by foreign law;149 the Roper majority thought it did no more 
than “underscore[]” existing “rights within our own heritage of freedom.”150  
Putting to one side the merits of these arguments, their intensity illus-
trates the seriousness with which questions of fit are often taken. The 
connections between American law and that of other communities remain 
contested. Whatever the right answer may be in any particular case, we 
think the rule of law requires that material taken across boundaries bear a 
defensible relationship to existing cultural practices and political commit-
ments.  
Consider again the First Amendment. It is sometimes said that “today 
[the Religion Clauses] are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and 
equality to ‘the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith 
such as Islam or Judaism.’ ”151 The endorsement test pioneered by Justice 
O’Connor takes the incorporation of equality into religious liberty law a step 
further. Under that approach, the salient question becomes whether the state’s 
action with respect to religion “sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”152 
But questions of fit continue to hound the endorsement test. For one, it 
is not apparent whether the endorsement approach should be a supplemental 
test or should replace other methods of assessing religion claims. There re-
mains significant dispute over whether a dignitary approach can truly 
capture the full range of interests identified by the First Amendment. Does 
equal access to resources, a solution that generally accompanies the equality 
model, capture all objections to government support of churches and reli-
gious organizations? All of these questions in fact suggest there remain 
crucial, but not always fully worked out, connections between equality and 
liberty. 
                                                                                                                      
 148. Id. at 626–27. 
 149. Id. at 628. 
 150. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
 151. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) 
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)). 
 152. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
TEBBE & TSAI FINAL 2M.DOC 12/21/2009 1:26 PM 
498 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 108:459 
 
Now that the language of equality saturates debate over the Religion 
Clauses, a pressing question of fit today concerns the point at which “differ-
entiation” becomes “discrimination.” To this point, adjudicators have 
occasionally engaged in the overheated rhetoric of equality when they in-
validate state action, rather than systematically theorizing the circumstances 
under which treating religious and nonreligious activity differently should 
rise to a matter of substantive justice.153 For instance, in Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School District,154 the Justices struck down a school policy 
that opened up a public school after hours for “social, civic, or recreational 
use”
155
 but not for religious activities.156 Along the way, Justice Thomas ridi-
culed the school’s position as “a modified heckler’s veto,” evoking the 
1960s in which African American protestors were cruelly attacked by pri-
vate citizens while states utilized various techniques to shut down 
demonstrations.157 Harry Kalven described the notion of the “Heckler’s 
Veto” this way: “If the police can silence the speaker, the law in effect ac-
knowledges a veto power in hecklers who can, by being hostile enough, get 
the law to silence any speaker of whom they do not approve.”158 
Should the state’s action in this instance be understood as “discrimina-
tion” either in the sense that it unjustifiably burdens or stigmatizes someone, 
or in the sense that the state is expressing hostility toward a private mes-
sage? If so, is it discrimination on par with the kinds of subordinating 
programs of the past against racial minorities and women, or does reaching 
such a constitutional judgment require considerations beyond the idea that a 
party is treated differently?159  
When the language of equality or speech (here, both) is brought to bear 
on a problem, it frames a matter in terms of access, thereby marginalizing 
more substantive concerns that might arise. Once the state is required to 
make such property management decisions on an equal basis, for fear of 
expressing animus, can it bar other community groups, such as the Aryan 
Youth, from using school grounds after hours?160 Perhaps public officials 
ought to retain the ability to decide not to facilitate speech by such groups. 
There might be an argument that the two scenarios can be distinguished on 
the ground that religious groups enjoy a privileged constitutional status vis-
à-vis other groups, though this answer is not obvious if the speech part of 
                                                                                                                      
 153. Typically, no Establishment Clause injury will be heard if subsidies or other public re-
sources are equally available.  
 154. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 155. Good News, 533 U.S. at 109. 
 156. Id. at 111–12. 
 157. Id. at 119. 
 158. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment 140 (1965). 
 159. For an argument that exclusions from support programs amount to impermissible dis-
crimination less often than is supposed, see Tebbe, supra note 55. 
 160. For a defense of state discretion to support nonreligious actors without also aiding reli-
gious ones, see id. at 1271–82. 
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the equation is taken seriously—for, under free speech principles, even the 
despised are entitled to some opportunity to congregate and make them-
selves heard.161  
We raise this example not because we necessarily disagree with where 
the Justices have drawn the line.162 Every adjudicative act entails trade-offs, 
and it seems defensible to demand, at least presumptively, equal access to 
public resources.163 After all, the school could always get out of the business 
of serving as after-hours property manager. Yet something valuable could be 
lost by putting a school in such an either-or position. And that, ultimately, is 
our point: wrapping a resource allocation question in the language of equal-
ity can raise as many questions as it answers.  
B. Transparency 
It may be profitable to evaluate an instance of constitutional borrowing 
according to how open and notorious it is. Appropriation is overt if the 
synthesis is undertaken self-consciously or systematically, if it cites to or 
quotes from accepted sources, or if it openly considers and rejects 
alternative formulations. A combination is covert if it is made without 
revealing its genesis or evolution, if it is presented as well-established 
despite the lack of a pedigree, or if it is made casually rather than 
painstakingly.  
Consider the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s (“SJC”) decision 
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,164 which provides an example 
of intersystem borrowing (incorporating federal law into state law) as well 
as interdomain appropriation (appealing to equality for the sake of liberty). 
Invalidating an opposite-sex marriage statute on equal protection grounds, 
the Justices prominently quoted from Lawrence v. Texas to affirm their “ob-
ligation . . . to define the liberty of all.”165 Throughout, the SJC couched the 
equality question as one enveloped in a “core concept of common human 
dignity,”166 or as conjoined principles of “respect for individual autonomy 
                                                                                                                      
 161. Political speech could likely be excluded in toto, but closing school doors only to a dis-
favored political perspective would be harder under existing law. 
 162. For an argument that the Good News Court drew the line in the wrong place because it 
failed to take into account the fact that an outside group was seeking to proselytize in an elementary 
school, see 2 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fair-
ness 206 (2008). 
 163. But cf. Tebbe, supra note 55 (arguing that government exclusion of religious groups from 
support ought to be constitutional more often than is commonly supposed). We note that, at least in 
the public school context, the Equal Access Act makes many of these questions less practical than 
theoretical by requiring equal treatment of school-sponsored student groups.  
 164. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 165. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)). 
 166. Id. 
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and equality under law.”167 These ideas were expressed in Lawrence as an 
exposition of the Fourteenth Amendment, but in the judgment of the SJC, 
they were guaranteed to a greater degree by the Massachusetts Constitution. 
The hybrid nature of Goodridge was underscored by the separate concur-
rence of Justice Greaney, who thought the same outcome could have been 
“more directly resolved using traditional equal protection analysis.”168  
The SJC made it obvious that the institution was adopting as its own—
and adapting—the Lawrence Court’s assertion that “[e]quality of treatment 
and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the 
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a deci-
sion on the latter point advances both interests.”169 In the process, the SJC 
replayed the U.S. Supreme Court’s own hedge between liberty and equality. 
Moreover, because the court quoted directly from Lawrence and pointed out 
that the precise question of gay marriage was left open in that decision, it 
was also apparent that the state court was, on its own initiative, going farther 
than the Lawrence Court had.  
Because Goodridge appropriated ideas of liberty (articulated by others) 
for the sake of equality and did so overtly, a reader is shown every step of 
the reasoning process. Transparency may invite disagreement by showing 
where the movable components of an argument are, thus exposing them to 
attack and possible ridicule. But opting for transparency also arguably re-
duces the tensions surrounding a controversial decision by acknowledging 
the hard choices facing a decisionmaker. Overt borrowing invites the citizen 
to walk along with the jurist in an exploration of constitutional possibilities, 
and the citizen is afforded the opportunity to embrace or reject the synthesis 
proffered. One could conclude that the SJC had no business drawing on a 
liberty case to adjudicate an equality controversy, or one could agree with 
the general approach but disagree with how the ideas were interwoven. At 
all events, the point is that signposting the appropriation can fill a delibera-
tive function, even if it ends up prompting more intense disagreement in the 
short run. 
                                                                                                                      
 167. Id. at 949; see also id. at 959 (“Whether and whom to marry, how to express sexual 
intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family—these are among the most basic of every 
individual’s liberty and due process rights.”). 
 168. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring). The California Supreme Court’s decision that the 
state’s same sex-marriage ban also contains an overt instance of borrowing. There is no question that 
the ruling’s equality rationale is firmly grounded in the state constitution, California legal prece-
dents, and even social transformations in the state regarding public attitudes toward homosexuality. 
Even so, the state court justices employed Lawrence as a model for answering the interpretive ques-
tion. Citing the case directly, and calling it “somewhat analogous,” they pointed to its repudiation of 
Bowers as proof that constitutional rights “properly should be understood in a broader and more 
neutral fashion so as to focus upon the substance of the interests that the constitutional right is in-
tended to protect.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 421 (Cal. 2008) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 565–77). 
 169. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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On other occasions, constitutional borrowing is conducted more cov-
ertly, without identifying a particular source, and without underscoring the 
interpretive innovation that might be involved. It might consist of language, 
reasons, or ideas that suffuse an opinion rather than a single, focused, 
prominent moment of appropriation. Consider the criminal procedure deci-
sion, Chambers v. Florida,170 which deemed the interrogation of several 
black youths over the course of several days and nights to be a denial of due 
process of law, in the process throwing out confessions made under du-
ress.
171
 The defendants had made both liberty and equality arguments, and 
the Justices chose to ignore the claims sounding in racial inequality, at least 
formally.172 
Yet the indications of racial injustice were too powerful to deny: in their 
search for a killer, police engaged in a racial dragnet, detaining and 
questioning upwards of forty African Americans.173 Justice Black’s 
integration of the ideas of equality and liberty proved to be sophisticated. 
First, the opinion recounted the facts in such a way that left little doubt of the 
racially charged atmosphere or of the sheriff’s immediate focus on black 
suspects.174 Second, Black seamlessly combined rationales of liberty and 
equality in recounting the background and purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: “Tyrannical governments had immemorially utilized dictatorial 
criminal procedure and punishment to make scapegoats of the weak, or of 
helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differed, who 
would not conform and who resisted tyranny.”175 In other words, protecting 
liberty by scrupulously enforcing fair procedures also made state actions 
“free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power.”176 Though the 
opinion did not directly accuse any of the state actors in this case of racial 
discrimination, Black insisted over and over that the ruling would 
nevertheless aid “the poor, the ignorant, the numerically weak, the 
friendless, and the powerless.”177 And in the application of these principles to 
the facts at hand, he referred to the defendants as “ignorant young colored 
                                                                                                                      
 170. 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
 171. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241. 
 172. Id.; see Brief in Support of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chambers v. Florida, No. 
195, July 11, 1939, at 25, 28 (contending that defendants’ equal protection and due process rights 
were violated because the evidence was tainted by “illegal influences,” including that their interro-
gator threatened to “turn[] them over to lynchers if they changed their stories”). Marshall’s brief 
may have invited this strategy by declining to make race-based arguments in their strongest form, 
yet subtly weaving perceived inequities into his liberty arguments.  
 173. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 229. 
 174. The Broward County Sheriff testified that he was rounding up blacks and taking them to 
the jail in Dade County “to escape a mob.” Id. at 230 (internal quotation marks omitted). Deputies 
arrested individuals without warrants and questioned them, eventually releasing everyone but the 
accused. The ruling repeatedly referred to “the haunting fear of mob violence.” Id. at 240. 
 175. Id. at 236. 
 176. Id. at 227. 
 177. Id. at 238. 
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tenant farmers” questioned “by state officers and other white citizens.”178 
Chambers ended with a ringing endorsement of judicial review “for the 
benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution—of whatever race, 
creed or persuasion.”179  
The Court has also engaged in veiled borrowing in order to encourage a 
liberty-oriented template for thinking about a problem. Strangely, the best 
recent example comes from free exercise law, even though that area has seen 
some of the most aggressive efforts to displace liberty rules with an equality 
framework, as we described above.180 In Locke v. Davey181 the Court softened 
its exclusive focus on evenhandedness and began to speak in terms that sub-
tly—but unmistakably—drew on liberty-oriented areas of constitutional law, 
particularly free speech and due process.182 At hand was the question of 
whether a state could establish a college scholarship that would be available 
to all students who met certain criteria, except those who planned to major 
in the study of religion from a faith perspective.183 At first, the scholarship 
seemed to involve just the sort of facial discrimination on the basis of relig-
ion that the Smith Court had said would remain presumptively invalid. Yet 
the Davey Court upheld the program without any particularly rigorous ex-
amination. It chiefly reasoned that Davey had not been excessively burdened 
when the state denied him a subsidy.184  
In the course of his majority opinion in Davey, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
emphasized that when the government establishes a subsidy program, it is 
entitled to decide which activities it wishes to fund and which ones it does 
not.185 Ordinary readers would not have placed any particular weight on that 
formulation. But to specialists, the statement carried covert significance. 
                                                                                                                      
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 241. Without having to take a firm position in the ongoing debate at that time over 
whether more aggressive judicial review was authorized when state action harmed a discrete and 
insular minority, Chambers rhetorically inclined in that direction.  
A similar instance of indirection occurred in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 
(1972), which invalidated a handful of vagrancy laws on vagueness grounds. Some of the defendants 
were African Americans and women, and the Justices strongly suggested that the liberty approach 
served the goals of equality: “Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance—
poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers—may be required to comport themselves according 
to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. . . . [T]he scheme . . . 
furnishes a convenient tool for ‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, 
against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.’ ” Id. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88, 97–98 (1940)). Justice Douglas ends his hedge toward equality thus: “[T]he rule 
of law implies equality and justice in its application. . . . The rule of law, evenly applied to minori-
ties as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society 
together.” Id. at 171. 
 180. See supra Section II.C. 
 181. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 182. For an earlier discussion of this interpretation in Davey, see supra text accompanying 
notes 94–100. 
 183. Davey, 540 U.S. at 724–25. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 720–21. 
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Rehnquist borrowed the trope from the abortion funding cases. One of those 
had held that when the government subsidizes childbirth, it need not also 
subsidize abortion.186 Another had established that when Congress estab-
lishes a program to support counseling around childbirth, it may require any 
abortion-related speech to occur in a segregated institution that does not 
receive federal aid.187 What made the borrowing covert was that Rehnquist 
did not cite either case—and certainly did not explain the analogy to abor-
tion funding, which involved a seemingly disparate area of constitutional 
law, namely due process. His borrowing was surreptitious in this sense, 
likely to be detected only by experts.188  
Now, the fact that constitutional borrowing can be covert does not in it-
self put it at odds with the rule of law. We can imagine good reasons for not 
signposting every interpretive move. First, requiring every instance of bor-
rowing to be explicit would force jurists to write inartful and dense opinions 
when brevity would better serve their needs. Second, there are many situa-
tions where a linkage between two domains is historically established such 
that it is uncontroversial to assert it in shorthand. Third, covert borrowing 
can be useful for reaching a defensible position, so long as the move away 
from the norm of transparency is for a jurisprudentially acceptable purpose. 
Think again of Chambers v. Florida,189 where the record of abuse or dis-
crimination “develop[ed] a sharp conflict” among the parties.190 Without 
accusing anyone of discrimination, the Court spoke of the potential for 
abuse more generally, preferring insinuations when it came to racial mis-
conduct. That example teaches that covertness can be productive if the 
doctrinal precedents are themselves not yet adequately developed, or if a 
social consensus in favor of a transformative agenda has not yet crystallized 
(for reasons like these, one might have preferred the liberty rationale to the 
equality rationale in the decades before Brown v. Board of Education).191  
While it does not make sense to abolish covert borrowing, there are 
trade-offs when one borrows furtively. Covert appropriation gains its power 
from naturalizing the linkage between disparate ideas. Many such linkages are 
subtle. Thus, it is entirely possible for careful specialists, no less than ordinary 
citizens, to miss the calibrated gestures. In many cases, the coupling will go 
unnoticed because the asserted association is entirely uncontroversial (either 
in terms of popular opinion, the expectations of specialists, or possibly both). 
But in at least some instances of covert borrowing, signposting is avoided pre-
cisely because a decisionmaker anticipates controversy. This was almost 
                                                                                                                      
 186. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–80 (1977). 
 187. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“[T]he Government has not discriminated on 
the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”). 
 188. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 99, at 176 (calling the migration unmistakable). 
 189. 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
 190. Id. at 238. 
 191. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding separate-but-equal education violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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certainly one of the calculations involved in Chambers, as the Justices ap-
parently wished to avoid inflaming local inhabitants in a high-profile death 
penalty crime. The impulse was also likely at play in Davey, where the 
Court looked to sensitive abortion decisions. In such instances, a choice is 
made to try to promote social acceptance of a legal position by framing it as 
a foregone conclusion, an easy case. The tactic can produce moving, and 
even memorable readings of law, but in some situations the suppression of 
disagreement in this fashion risks producing incremental change without an 
appropriate degree of public deliberation.  
C. Completeness 
A matter well worth investigating is the extent of appropriation. We call 
this the question of completeness. How much of a prior work is copied and 
what is left behind? Is it an offhand move or a serious one? Does an actor 
mean to take an entire system of thought and make it salient to the matter at 
hand for disputes going forward, or is it a more targeted compilation of 
ideas? Is the effort meant to be duplicated in the future or, based on its 
treatment, is it likely to be disowned or ignored at a later date? 
RLUIPA192 exemplifies incomplete borrowing. Disagreeing with the 
Court’s decision to strike down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,193 
Congress pushed back in a calibrated fashion. It did so by reappropriating 
the idea of strict scrutiny for some, but not all, situations where a person’s 
religious freedom might be unduly constrained by local law or policy.194 Re-
call that strict scrutiny had previously been transferred from other areas of 
constitutional law into free exercise, only to be abandoned in Employment 
Division v. Smith for most types of free exercise claims.195 In RLUIPA, 
                                                                                                                      
 192. RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part:  
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a 
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or insti-
tution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, 
assembly, or institution— 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006). 
 193. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 194. Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA restricts strict scrutiny for land-use regulations, programs, and 
penal institutions that receive federal funds or substantially burden “commerce with foreign nations, 
among the several States, or with Indian tribes.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2)(B), 2000cc–1(b)(2). For 
a more comprehensive analysis of RLUIPA, see Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Condemning 
Religion: RLUIPA and the Politics of Eminent Domain, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2010). 
 195. See supra Section II.C. Under Smith, a presumption of unconstitutionality will still apply 
if the government targets religious behavior, if it administers a system of individualized considera-
tion in such a way that nonreligious actors are given relief while religious ones are not, or if a claim 
is “hybrid” in the sense that it involves the violation of more than one constitutional right. See Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). 
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Congress reinstated the presumption of unconstitutionality for laws that 
place a substantial burden on observance, but only in two narrow settings: 
prisons196 and land-use regulations.197 Therefore, we should consider 
RLUIPA a partial, legislative exercise in borrowing.198 
Why pursue a strategy of partial borrowing? The history of interbranch 
dialogue over the scope of religious liberty already showed that the Supreme 
Court favored a narrow, and decidedly court-centered, interpretation of 
Congress’s Section Five power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.199 
Tailored borrowing in this instance has given the Court another opportunity 
to rethink its reading of Congress’s Section Five authority without threaten-
ing the judiciary’s core function. Because the statute does not seek to 
challenge the Court across the board, it is possible to imagine it as a meas-
ured response rather than a reflexive rejection. For this reason, the strategy 
increases the odds that the statute will be approved, even if approval is not 
required by the courts.200 If Congress’s gambit is successful, it will prompt 
the Justices to back away from the notion that “strict scrutiny” is a term of 
art that only judges may use in this area. Partial borrowing in RLUIPA thus 
may lead to a more cooperative relationship between Congress and the Judi-
ciary with regard to the enforcement of religious freedom. A byproduct may 
be a more realistic understanding of how constitutional terminology can 
cross boundaries and when mutual usage of such ideas will in fact benefit 
the rule of law. 
Incomplete borrowing preserves maneuverability in current and future 
deliberations. For this and other reasons (particularly in the common law 
system, which prefers incrementalism), it is wishful thinking to hope for a 
truly complete instance of borrowing every time out. Three justifications for 
incomplete borrowing come to mind: (1) it is impossible to anticipate all 
uses and misuses of a particular position; (2) judges have imperfect informa-
tion as to the likely reactions of key actors; and (3) given these uncertainties, 
                                                                                                                      
 196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. 
 197. Id. § 2000cc. 
 198. To the extent that Congress interpreted the First Amendment in RLUIPA, it also provides 
an example of constitutional borrowing. 
 199. For a fuller account of the history of dialogue between the Court and Congress concern-
ing the scope of religious liberty in the wake of Smith, see Tebbe, supra note 119, at 705–11, 725–
27. 
 200. Congress did not limit itself to this Section Five argument, but also claimed the power to 
enact RLUIPA under the Spending Clause (for the prison provisions) and under the Commerce 
Clause (for the land-use provisions). Yet it is quite clear that Congress targeted these two areas in 
part because it thought it could build a record of significant violations of religious freedom with 
regard to institutionalized persons, on the one hand, and zoning and landmarking determinations, on 
the other. That record would show violations even under Smith and would establish Congress’s 
authority to enact such legislation under the enforcement power in Section Five. See 146 Cong. 
Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement by Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (“The [provi-
sion] requiring that substantial burdens on religious exercise be justified by a compelling interest, 
applies only to cases within the spending power or the commerce power, or to cases where [it is 
possible to make out a claim under the individualized assessments rule of Smith].”). 
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it may be wise to see if a fresh combination of ideas takes hold before sig-
naling total commitment, to leave room for reconsideration or a better 
alignment of constitutional interests. In this respect, incomplete borrowing 
aligns with the judicial instincts of incrementalism and deliberativeness, 
rule-of-law values that help to promote a sense, if not always the reality, of 
stability.201  
Still, for all of the potential upside of partial borrowing, there may be 
drawbacks. One risk is that questions of fit may not be adequately dealt with 
ahead of time, and that the consequences of appropriation later haphazardly 
confronted, if at all. Another is that others may be unwilling to accept it 
without knowing more. Take an instance of borrowing from one understand-
ing of equality to another, pursued by proponents of a right to marry for 
same-sex couples. Both in mobilizing the public and filing lawsuits, they 
have likened denial of marriage rights on the basis of sexual orientation to 
the injustice of a similar exclusion on the basis of race.202 This is more than 
the borrowing of a legal precedent—it is the taking of another’s historical 
experience for a persuasive purpose, and in some quarters, such a compari-
son has been actively resisted.203 Some of the resistance has to do with fear 
that referencing someone else’s experience invariably transforms it. Doing 
so may alter the historical magnitude of the earlier event by asserting a su-
perficial, even false, equivalence; worse, the appropriation may transfer 
control over historical memory. Other concerns about partial borrowing 
seem to reflect uncertainties about the policy consequences of aligning race 
and sexual orientation. One outraged group decried “the genderless mar-
riage project” for “mak[ing] just such an appropriation.”204 
Think, too, of the undue-burden and endorsement tests. Each time either 
test has migrated across domains, the derivative work has changed. Rework-
ing a legal standard from another field could involve partial borrowing. 
Taking some features of a test but not others can give a misleading sense of 
progress or it can obscure substantive changes to the law. Casey’s importa-
                                                                                                                      
 201. See generally infra Section V.C (discussing implications of borrowing for minimalism). 
 202. See, e.g., Brief for Professors of History and Family Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at *6–7, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (No. 17,716), 
2007 WL 4725460 (“Anti-miscegenation laws were considered an intrinsic part of marriage law and 
were justified as enacting what nature or God dictated and preventing ‘corruption’ of the institution 
of marriage. . . . As in the case of laws regulating the duties of spouses in marriage, racial regula-
tions that had predominated for centuries changed to reflect society’s evolving conceptions of 
equality.”); Adam Liptak, Gay Marriage Through a Black-White Prism, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2006, 
§ 4, at 43. 
 203. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he traditional definition of mar-
riage is not merely a by-product of historical injustice. Its history is of a different kind [from anti-
miscegenation laws].”); Karl Vick & Ashley Surdin, Most of California’s Black Voters Backed Gay 
Marriage Ban; 53% of Latinos Also Supported Proposition 8, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 2008, at A3 
(quoting African American outreach director of the Protect Marriage Campaign as stating that “[t]he 
gay community was never considered a third of a person”). 
 204. Brief for United Families Connecticut as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-
Appellees at *14–15, Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407 (No. 17,716), 2007 WL 4725443. Of course, we do 
not sanction this argument. 
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tion of an existing standard conveyed the Court’s continuing commitment to 
the rule of law, but it also helped to obscure the fact that its commitment to a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy had become significantly more 
complicated. Just as important, partial borrowing may imply that a test is 
equally demanding across contexts when in fact much depends on the par-
ticular circumstances. Application of the undue-burden test to actual state 
efforts to circumscribe abortion surely warrants such a conclusion. The 
same could be said of the Establishment Clause area, where proponents of 
the endorsement approach have enjoyed only partial success.205 What counts 
as state “endorsement” of religion is more limited than what the word signi-
fies in equal protection law or even in ordinary parlance: to show favoritism, 
support, or approval. For some, it may mean no more than that the state is 
not actively discriminating against a person of faith. Others may hold a 
more stringent view. But these differences are not apparent from the face of 
the test or even the Court’s own definition of the term. 
One final concern about an act of copying that is woefully partial: the 
tactic can transfer significant discretion to differently constituted bodies, 
raising doubts about the extent of an institution’s commitment to constitu-
tional principles. As the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence has illustrated, 
just what constitutes an undue burden on a woman’s right or when the state 
has endorsed religion owes much to changes in the Court’s composition. 
Simultaneously overt and incomplete appropriation carries added risks, as 
the chances of a major doctrinal shift in the absence of sustained contempla-
tion increase enormously. 
D. Yield 
It may be fruitful to ask whether an instance of borrowing is intended to 
promote or resist the law’s development along its present path, and to what 
extent it is successful in terms of the borrower’s aims. Such purposes and 
consequences collectively constitute the yield of an act of borrowing. Along 
these lines, we call the appropriation of one set of ideas to alter or expand 
another area of law an offensive use of the tactic. By contrast, doing so to 
shore up, amplify, or preserve the vitality of an existing set of ideas consti-
tutes defensive borrowing. If an act of borrowing produces nothing 
worthwhile in either direction, that failure may provide legitimate grounds 
for criticism. 
Grutter v. Bollinger206 illustrates defensive appropriation in action. The 
outcome surprised many observers because it rescued affirmative action in 
public universities, on the condition that admissions policies preserve the 
ideal of individualized assessment of applicants’ profiles. In the process, 
Justice O’Connor’s ruling drew upon the First Amendment to shore up a 
                                                                                                                      
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 152–153 (describing adoption of the endorsement 
test as an example of borrowing from equality doctrines). 
 206. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
TEBBE & TSAI FINAL 2M.DOC 12/21/2009 1:26 PM 
508 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 108:459 
 
besieged Equal Protection jurisprudence by carving out an island of permis-
sive race-consciousness in a sea of race-disfavoring precedent.  
In reasoning that university officials enjoyed a measure of discretion to 
consider the race and ethnic background of prospective students, the opinion 
might have simply recounted the ways in which the context differed from 
private contracting or redistricting, and left it at that. But falling back on this 
truism became difficult because of conditions the Justices themselves cre-
ated: for years, they had inveighed against race-dependent decisions by 
public officials, regardless of whether policies were motivated by a desire to 
hurt or help minorities. Promoting the individualist position, they called 
such proxies “offensive and demeaning,”207 and dangerous for “balkaniz[ing] 
us into competing racial factions”208 and for “promot[ing] notions of racial 
inferiority and lead[ing] to a politics of racial hostility.”209 Saying admis-
sions decisions were different somehow seemed inadequate, open to the 
criticism that this amounted to disingenuous line drawing.  
Searching for a way of dealing with the prospect of thwarted public ex-
pectations may explain why the Justices chose to couch the University of 
Michigan’s interest in the benign use of race in constitutional terms. Here is 
how O’Connor put it: “We have long recognized that, given the important 
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and 
thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a 
special niche in our constitutional tradition.”210 Thus, Grutter drew upon 
ideas of liberty defensively. 
To discern the borrowers’ possible motivations, consider a path not 
taken: a strong line of cases from within equal protection jurisprudence it-
self, arising in the late 1940s and powerfully ratified by Brown v. Board of 
Education,211 stands for the idea that the educational interaction of people 
from different races enhanced the experiences of all—why not just go there? 
Two concerns might have given a jurist pause. First, those precedents in-
volved the state employing race to exclude or otherwise damage the 
prospects of a racial minority. Second, the Justices had largely discredited 
the practice of citing those cases expansively in the name of diversity. So 
one would have to look elsewhere to give university officials the “special” 
authority to take account of race. The academic freedom cases proved to be 
an intriguing avenue to reach a result that had otherwise been foreclosed. 
The novelty of relying on First Amendment cases to blunt the logical force 
of the Court’s own recent antiaffirmative pronouncements grounded in the 
Equal Protection Clause should not be missed. 
                                                                                                                      
 207. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995). 
 208. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
 209. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
 210. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. See generally Paul Horwtiz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 
B.C. L. Rev. 461 (2005) (pointing out the First Amendment implications of the ruling). 
 211. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Complications linger from this moment of cross-fertilization. For one 
thing, many of the academic freedom cases involved teachers or students 
resisting university policy and did not provide a constitutional grounding for 
university policy based on institutional self-definition.212 It is not readily 
apparent how far the First Amendment could be employed by universities to 
resist legal challenges by individuals or burdens demanded by governmental 
entities. Moreover, the companion case Gratz v. Bollinger213 made no men-
tion of the First Amendment rationale. That absence suggests that the actual 
scope of any right to self-definition on the part of the university remains 
open to question.214 Worse, it could later be rejected as merely seasoning in 
Grutter rather than an effort to articulate a First Amendment right in earnest. 
Whatever the case, the general points, we think, hold true: the Justices crea-
tively borrowed from a relatively unsullied area of law to avoid having to 
grapple anew with its university cases from the Equal Protection context and 
to justify a departure from ordinary equal protection analysis.  
If Grutter involved a defensive appropriation, then a case like Boyd v. 
United States215 epitomizes offensive borrowing. In that decision, Justice 
Bradley invalidated a federal statute requiring a defendant or claimant in a 
civil proceeding under the revenue laws of the United States to make his 
papers available for inspection on pain of the allegations being “taken as 
confessed.”216 The ruling made several synthetic moves with the cumulative 
effect of expanding the protections of liberty and personal property under 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Boyd incorporated the British case of 
Entick v. Carrington,217 in which Lord Camden deemed “illegal and void” 
the Secretary of State’s practice of issuing general warrants to search private 
                                                                                                                      
 212. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967) (holding that vague 
law empowering dismissal of university employees for uttering seditious words implicated “aca-
demic freedom”); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1960) (describing “academic liberty” in 
terms of associational rights of teachers); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) 
(holding that contempt sanction against university professor for refusing to answer questions regard-
ing classroom lectures invaded “academic freedom and political expression,” grounded in “political 
freedom of the individual”). An effort to expand the notion of “academic freedom” to encompass 
certain “burdens imposed by a university” in Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Stevens and 
Breyer, JJ.), gained only three votes. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277–81 (1981) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that some decisions by university to allocate scarce re-
sources should be protected by “academic freedom”). For some possible readings of Grutter on this 
point, see generally Horwitz, supra note 210. 
 213. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 214. We take no further position on the persuasiveness of Grutter’s borrowing of the First 
Amendment, other than to note that “academic freedom” was a limited and highly contested concept 
in earlier cases. For a case that illustrates the fragility of the idea, see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Aca-
demic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69–70 (2006) (rejecting claim that law requiring 
access to military recruiters as condition for federal funds violates universities’ freedom of expres-
sive association). 
 215. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 216. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620. 
 217. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.). 
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homes and seize personal books, papers, and effects as evidence of seditious 
libel.218 Completing the act of transplantation, Justice Bradley argued:  
As every American statesman, during our revolutionary and formative pe-
riod as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English 
freedom, and considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitu-
tional law, it may be confidently asserted that its propositions were in the 
minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
. . . . 
219
 
Furthermore, the opinion suggested that the subject matters of the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments “run almost into each other.”220 Justice Bradley sig-
naled the mutual appropriation underway: “We have already noticed the 
intimate relation between the two amendments. They throw great light on 
each other.”221 In applying these broad principles to the facts at bar, he 
brushed aside both the fact that no physical seizure was required by the law, 
a potential hurdle for the Fourth Amendment claim, as well as any objection 
that revenue proceedings are civil in nature, which arguably put the statute 
beyond the Fifth Amendment’s bar against self-incrimination.222 Justice 
Bradley insisted that the statute effectuated a constructive search, even if the 
proceedings lacked “the aggravating incidents of actual search and sei-
zure.”
223
 Likewise, he determined the proceedings to be “quasi-criminal” in 
nature for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.224 In short, the importation of 
foreign case law and the hedging of the Boyd Court between the possible 
grounds of decision, all were conducted with the principal goal of expand-
ing domestic notions of liberty aggressively.  
How does the offensive–defensive dyad help those who wish to uncover 
and assess what is transpiring? First, the terminology trains attention on the 
strategic motivations and doctrinal effects entailed in borrowing. What are 
the intended and actual consequences of the move—to defend rapidly erod-
ing territory or stake out new ground? Is the appropriated material intended 
                                                                                                                      
 218. Id. at 818. 
 219. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 633. 
 222. Dissatisfied with the majority’s decision to blend and give credence to both rationales, 
Justice Miller preferred to say that “this is a criminal case within the meaning of that clause of the 
Fifth Amendment . . . .” Id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring). To his mind, “[t]here is in fact no search 
and seizure authorized by the statute.” Id. Instead, he believed that: 
The order of the court under the statute is in effect a subpoena duces tecum, and, though the 
penalty for the witness’s failure to appear in court with the criminating papers is not fine and 
imprisonment, it is one which may be made more severe, namely, to have charges against him 
of a criminal nature, taken for confessed, and made the foundation of the judgment of the 
court. 
Id. 
 223. Id. at 635. 
 224. Id. at 634. 
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to cultivate a fresh line of argument or sow the seeds of an existing frame-
work’s demise? Engaging the matter in this way focuses analysis on the 
scope of a borrower’s efforts, how they might impact other lines of doctrinal 
development irrespective of one’s intentions, as well as the social capital 
that might have to be expended to sustain a particular project. In other 
words, focusing on yield, whether defensive or offensive, aids the effort to 
evaluate a particular act of borrowing. 
Second, since all interpretive choices are made in an environment of cul-
tural and political change, one can better assess what external factors a 
constitutional actor might be seeking to accommodate or resist through 
cross-pollination. The Grutter Court’s defensive creativity may have been a 
response to an outpouring of support for affirmative action by business lead-
ers, university presidents, and military officials. What remains to be seen is 
whether the defense of diversity provokes conversations beyond the univer-
sity dimension or whether Grutter and Gratz remain special cases. 
Similarly, Boyd appeared to entrench still-robust notions of property and 
liberty in its reading of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, drawing on con-
fident expositions of such ideals. Later attempts to undermine Boyd’s 
synthesis could be seen as efforts to limit the far-reaching nature of its 
premises to effectuate the rise of the modern administrative state and en-
trench its existence.225 The audience for an act of cross-fertilization may not 
be judges or lawyers alone, but administrators, legislators, and ordinary citi-
zens. If this is so, then it may be worthwhile for studies of borrowing to 
evaluate how effective these accommodations actually are. 
V. Implications for Theory 
Our investigation of borrowing carries implications for constitutional 
theory. In this Part, we juxtapose our evaluation of the practice with five 
prominent contemporary approaches: originalism, living constitutionalism, 
minimalism, redemptive constitutionalism, and popular constitutionalism. 
Chiefly, we conclude that drawing attention to cross-fertilization, and valu-
ing it in the way we propose, cuts against theories that seek to limit judicial 
creativity most strictly. On the other hand, we identify places where borrow-
ing cannot easily be assimilated even by proposals that otherwise provide 
greater room for judicial action, such as living constitutionalism and redemp-
tive constitutionalism. We also show how an appreciation of borrowing can 
augment each theory, and vice versa. Throughout, we take care to acknowl-
edge that borrowing is only one persuasive technique among many, and we 
recognize that our defense of borrowing is incidental to the main thrust of 
most constitutional theory. Nevertheless, we aim to show how adherents of 
                                                                                                                      
 225. See generally William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 
93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016 (1995); Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886–1976), 76 
Mich. L. Rev. 184 (1977).  
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each approach could profit from a study of the practice of constitutional 
borrowing. 
A. Originalism 
Although borrowing seems to entail just the sort of hermeneutic creativ-
ity that troubles originalists, in fact it often plays an important role in 
deciphering the original meanings of the Constitution. Consequently, stu-
dents of borrowing and originalists have quite a bit more to say to one 
another than might at first be supposed. For clarity, we will assume here a 
fairly pure form of originalism, according to which original meanings 
should be virtually determinative in constitutional decisionmaking and are 
privileged over other interpretive methods.226 However, we put to one side 
versions of the theory that look to the subjective intent of framers or ratifi-
ers, engaging instead with versions that privilege the initial public 
understanding of constitutional provisions.227  
Two values seem to drive common versions of originalism—the democ-
ratic authority of the Constitution and the rule of law—and both of these 
factors might at first seem to disfavor migration.228 First, the will of the peo-
ple might be undermined if readers of one provision of the Constitution 
were permitted to lift meanings from other provisions freely (assuming such 
crossovers were not originally contemplated). On this view, importing a 
concern for equality of gay men and lesbians into due process jurisprudence, 
in the style of the Lawrence Court,229 could work to unmoor privacy law 
from the act of ratification by the sovereign people.230  
Originalism is designed to enhance a second constitutional value as 
well, namely the rule of law.231 The hope is that tying judges to the original 
understanding of the Constitution will limit individual idiosyncrasy and re-
sult in a set of interpretations that are more stable from case to case. 
Borrowing might well be seen as a threat to that sort of legal stability, be-
cause the practice entails thinking beyond the boundaries of settled doctrinal 
                                                                                                                      
 226. See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 
165, 166 & n.1 (2008) (citing as examples Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitu-
tion: The Presumption of Liberty 4–5, 88 (2004); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional 
Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (1999); Antonin 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 854 (1989)). 
 227. This version of the theory is sometimes called “original meaning originalism.” See, e.g., 
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 
Const. Comment. 383, 388 (2007). 
 228. Primus, supra note 226, at 167 & n.6 (identifying these two principal justifications for 
originalism, and citing Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. Rev. 204, 204 (1980), and Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
599 (2004)). 
 229. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 230. Here we are assuming that the right to privacy itself has been ratified in the first place. 
For our earlier analysis of Lawrence, see supra Introduction and Section III.C. 
 231. See Primus, supra note 226, at 169, 211–20. 
TEBBE & TSAI FINAL 2M.DOC 12/21/2009 1:26 PM 
February 2010] Constitutional Borrowing 513 
 
fields.232 Pure originalism may mistrust a judicial technique that seems to 
invite just the sort of untethered interpretive ingenuity that could lead judges 
to read their own predilections into the text. So, in sum, looking at both of 
the values that drive originalism might suggest that adherents would resist 
borrowing.  
Yet in fact there is significant overlap between constitutional borrowing 
and originalist practice. Interestingly, leading originalists often do look 
afield when they interpret the text. As a consequence, they have something 
to gain from thinking carefully about the types of, and justifications for, mi-
gration among constitutional domains. Conversely, students of borrowing 
ought to pay attention to how the practice has been deployed by those who 
limit themselves to historical methods of deciphering the Constitution.  
Consider once again the majority opinion in Heller.233 There Justice 
Scalia construes the Second Amendment partly by reference to long-
standing constructions of the First Amendment’s speech provision. First, of 
course, he notices that both rights have limits: at the time of the founding, 
citizens were not thought to able to “speak for any purpose” and that seems 
to count as evidence that they also had no entitlement “to carry arms for any 
sort of confrontation.”234  
Moreover, Scalia imports the mechanism for determining the contours of 
the right. Rather than the undue-burden approach proposed by Justice 
Breyer in dissent, he insists on a more categorical form of protection. The 
First Amendment was originally understood to prioritize speech interests 
above all others—with discrete exceptions for obscenity, libel, and the 
like—and it was not designed to allow courts to determine later on that the 
government’s interests overrode the right to expression on a case-by-case 
basis.235 So too, according to Heller, the Second Amendment was thought to 
guarantee the freedom of law-abiding citizens to defend their homes through 
the use of firearms,236 with the state able to limit the right only within certain 
                                                                                                                      
 232. There is an obvious irony here, since we have argued that the exchange of ideas across 
doctrinal lines most often works to foster generality and predictability in the law. See supra Section 
III.A. 
 233. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). For our earlier discussion of the 
case, see supra Section II.A. 
 234. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799.  
 235. In his words: 
Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the peo-
ple adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that 
scope too broad. We would not apply an “interest-balancing” approach to the prohibition of a 
peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie. The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-
speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and 
disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-
headed views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the very product of 
an interest—balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them 
anew. 
Id. at 2821 (citations omitted). 
 236. See id. at 2810. 
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bounded categories, such as possession by felons, ownership by the inca-
pacitated, and carrying arms near schools.237  
In sum, while the Heller Court is stoutly originalist—it says at one point 
that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were under-
stood to have when the people adopted them”238—still it leaves ample room 
for cross-fertilization among domains of original public meaning.239 Now 
certainly proponents like Scalia may wish to limit borrowing to particular 
time periods, namely those in which the various constitutional provisions 
were framed and ratified. A borrowing enthusiast would chafe at that sort of 
restriction on cross-historical sharing. Yet despite such differences, original-
ists may take a surprising degree of interest in this Article’s effort to define, 
describe, and defend the practice.  
B. Living Constitutionalism 
Living constitutionalism allows interpreters to go beyond original mean-
ings, at least some of the time.240 Though that approach is more open to 
borrowing than some others, its adherents have not yet appreciated the im-
port of the practice for the development of constitutional understandings.  
One variant of the theory holds that the Constitution’s commands have 
been revised from time to time through extraordinary popular mobiliza-
tion.241 Those revisions are then available for application by jurists to 
specific disputes. This sort of living constitutionalism dovetails with consti-
tutional borrowing at several points. Most generally, it creates conceptual 
space for the deployment of borrowing to effectuate constitutional change 
that has been legitimated by sufficient popular agreement. On this view, 
courts can and should engage in importation when doing so would help 
to clear pathways of appropriate revision. Common law techniques—
                                                                                                                      
 237. Id. at 2816–17. Other instances of borrowing in Heller may raise questions for original-
ists. For instance, the opinion draws from the English Bill of Rights’s protection against the 
disarmament of Protestants, id. at 2798, as well as from state constitutions in America that protect 
certain gun rights. Id. at 2802–04. It makes these connections despite the possibility that differences 
in context may limit these sources’ ability to decipher the original meaning of the Second Amend-
ment. Each of these moves, too, is better understood as an instance of borrowing rather than an 
argument from precedent. They are transparent in that they are difficult to miss, and yet they natural-
ize historical crossovers that may not be as appropriate as they seem. 
 238. Id. at 2821. 
 239. Across domains (First Amendment–Second Amendment) as well as systems (state–
federal and English–American). 
 240. Living constitutionalism is difficult to define; it is often described simply in opposition 
to originalism. Perhaps partly for that reason, the approach appears to be embattled today, even 
among progressives. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 
291 (2007); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 Const. Comment. 
353, 353 (2007) (“It certainly seems like the originalists are winning.”). But see Jack M. Balkin, 
Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead Constitution, Slate, Aug. 29, 2005, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2125226/ (“We are all living constitutionalists now.”). 
 241. In his Holmes Lectures, Bruce Ackerman aligns his own sophisticated theory with living 
constitutionalism. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007).  
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presumably including borrowing—can play a role in constitutionalism by 
implementing the imperatives generated by prior engagement of the peo-
ple.242  
Living constitutionalism (of this ilk) has not yet acknowledged the use-
fulness of constitutional borrowing for its project. That should not be 
altogether surprising, since the practice we identify has operated in the 
background until now. Quite simply, borrowing is one of the ways in which 
jurists incorporate acts of popular mobilization into the canon.243  
Conversely, living constitutionalism has a contribution to make to the 
argument of this Article, namely the insight that borrowing may find sources 
not only in court decisions, but also in extraordinary statutes and other 
products of clear democratic expression. For example, Bruce Ackerman has 
argued that decisions upholding the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s, together 
with popular approval of the laws themselves, may elevate to canonical sta-
tus the constitutional judgments contained in the laws.244 If that is right, then 
courts may legitimately lift devices or mechanisms from these laws for use 
in constitutional interpretation, application, and even extrapolation.245  
Our assessment of constitutional borrowing also exceeds the bounds of 
this brand of living constitutionalism. That theory rejects common law tech-
niques that stray too far from acts of popular sovereignty. Unmoored from 
expressions of the people’s will—whether in formal amendments, landmark 
statutes, or momentous elections—constitutional interpretation risks impair-
ing its legitimacy.246 In our view, however, constitutional borrowing may be 
appropriate not solely when it lifts concepts from authorities that have re-
ceived the imprimatur of democratic mobilization, but more generally when 
doing so will promote values of generality and empowerment.247 That is not 
to say that rule-of-law considerations will always trump considerations of 
popular sovereignty whenever a particular instance of cross-pollination is 
                                                                                                                      
 242. Leib, supra note 240, at 361 (arguing that living constitutionalists allow “interpretive 
mechanics” and “ ‘extrinsic’ constitutional modalities” to play a role throughout constitutional inter-
pretation, while originalists allow use of these mechanisms only “in later conceptual stages of the 
interpretive enterprise”). In particular, Ackerman hopes to show how judicial techniques can be 
employed to elevate the status of the Second Reconstruction to “one of the greatest acts of popular 
sovereignty in American history.” Ackerman, supra note 241, at 1788. 
 243. Ackerman, supra note 241, at 1788 (“My aim has been to provide common law tools that 
will permit the profession to recognize the Second Reconstruction for what it was—one of the 
greatest acts of popular sovereignty in American history.”). 
 244. Id. at 1791 (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)). 
 245. Consider an extraordinary implication: judges might begin to revise their treatment of 
laws that impose a disparate impact on certain subordinate groups. Instead of requiring litigants to 
show a discriminatory purpose in order to trigger serious judicial examination, courts could import 
from statutes concerning employment and housing a rebuttable presumption of invalidity for laws 
that reinforce social stratification. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 100–01. Looking to these trans-
formative statutes might also inspire courts to craft remedies for disparate impact that involve the 
judgments of political branches. 
 246. Ackerman, supra note 241, at 1801. 
 247. In this sense, constitutional borrowing may have greater affinity with the “organicists” 
that Ackerman identifies, such as Justices Holmes and Jackson. Id. at 1800–01.  
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assessed. But our account does provide independent reasons for supporting 
specific acts of borrowing that cannot be found among arguments supplied 
by living constitutionalists. 
C. Minimalism 
Constitutional borrowing is a tool of common law adjudication available 
for use by minimalist judges. It is conceptually compatible with incremental 
decisionmaking and may be deployed in the spirit of judicial modesty. Yet 
minimalism would probably resist full-blown migration in ways that stu-
dents of borrowing might profitably consider. Conversely, borrowing’s 
virtues may give strict minimalists some reason for pause. 
Minimalism champions judicial humility expressed in an incremental 
method of constitutional adjudication.248 It encourages courts to decide as 
little as possible in order to minimize certain risks, including the possibility 
of outright error. Minimalism is also designed to reduce the risk of political 
backlash against controversial decisions. To the degree that the law is left 
undertheorized, chances improve that a judgment may win the approval of 
people with diverse foundational commitments.249 
Minimalism opposes pure forms of originalism, which prioritize original 
meaning over precedent or tradition with potentially revolutionary conse-
quences.250 It also stands against perfectionist theories of interpretation, both 
liberal and conservative, that seek to interpret the Constitution in accordance 
with one or another substantive philosophy or vision of justice.251 In contrast 
to these theories, minimalism urges judges to build on the collective wisdom 
of the Anglo-American constitutional tradition in stepwise fashion.  
Instances of minimalist borrowing are commonplace and may occur 
whenever courts trade among closely related fields of constitutional law. If 
                                                                                                                      
 248. We describe an ideal-typical version of minimalism that is useful for our analysis but not 
identical to the theory advanced by any specific thinker. Of course the prominent version is associ-
ated with Cass Sunstein. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism 
on the Supreme Court (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-
Wing Courts Are Wrong for America 27–30 (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Radicals in 
Robes]; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353 (2006) [hereinafter Sun-
stein, Burkean Minimalism]; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving 
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Foreword]. Another adherent 
of minimalism might be Justice Stephen Breyer. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty 5–6 
(2005). For an eloquent critique, see Ronald Dworkin, Looking for Cass Sunstein, N.Y. Rev. Books, 
April 30, 2009, at 29. 
 249. For additional discussion of minimalists’ preference for “shallow” rulings, see Sunstein, 
Burkean Minimalism, supra note 248, at 364, and Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 248, at 20–22. 
 250. If the framers envisioned incremental constitutional evolution, then originalism and 
minimalism may dovetail. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 248, at 389. 
 251. Id. at 394 (citing Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006), and Richard A. Epstein, 
Takings (1985), as implicit examples of liberal and conservative perfectionism, respectively); see also 
Sunstein, Radicals in Robes, supra note 248, at 31–34 (describing the characteristics of perfectionist 
theorists). For another example of perfectionism, see James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional 
Democracy (2006). 
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Lawrence can be understood as a minimalist decision, as some have argued, 
then its importation of certain equality notions fulfills the aims of 
incrementalism.252 One of the techniques exemplified in that case—
hedging—aligns particularly well with minimalism’s skepticism of doctrinal 
maximalism and experimentation at reduced cost. Should either the equality 
or liberty rationale prove more durable because it is less controversial, the 
other rationale can be adjusted, all without doing violence to the law. In this 
way, judicious resort to borrowing may help to generate principled yet 
incomplete statements of law.  
Even so, borrowing cannot easily be confined to thin readings of law 
and, in fact, it could well be turned to the cause of theoretical ambition. One 
story we have told recounts how the Court has traded between equality and 
liberty conceptions of the Free Exercise Clause, initially by lifting the strict 
scrutiny mode of analysis from speech decisions in the 1960s, and later by 
displacing that approach with a ban on disparate impact claims taken from 
equal protection law.253 Neither of those instances necessarily exceeded the 
bounds of legitimate borrowing that we have set out. They therefore suggest 
that there may be a tension between exuberant borrowing and pure minimal-
ism. Restricting borrowing to minimalist uses will almost certainly tend to 
dilute its virtues, particularly generality and empowerment.254 Whereas 
minimalism tends to limit adjudication to specific areas of doctrine, consti-
tutional borrowing may support decisions that look beyond the immediate 
legal domain for useful tools and points of mutual contact.  
While our analysis does not undermine minimalism as a general inter-
pretive orientation, it does encourage minimalists to identify places where 
borrowing may promote or impede incremental adjudication. Conversely, 
proponents of borrowing should consider whether the values associated with 
the practice might sometimes be overbalanced by the risks that that mini-
malism warns against. 
D. Redemptive Constitutionalism 
Recently Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel have called for a “redemptive 
constitutionalism,” under which judges, legislators, and litigants would work 
to vindicate the egalitarian purposes of the original Constitution and the Re-
construction Amendments.255 Redemptive constitutionalism was practiced 
during the civil rights movement of the 1960s (which they refer to as the 
                                                                                                                      
 252. See Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 248, at 378–79 & 379 n.138 (offering 
Lawrence as an example of rationalist minimalism, though acknowledging other possible readings 
of the decision).  
 253. See supra Section II.C. 
 254. Sunstein has recognized that minimalism may put pressure on the rule of law. Sunstein, 
Burkean Minimalism, supra note 248, at 365 (“Narrowness [which is prized by minimalists] is 
likely to breed unpredictability and perhaps unequal treatment. It might even do violence to the rule 
of law, if only because it leaves so much uncertainty.”). 
 255. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 101–03. 
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Second Reconstruction), but its methods have largely been forgotten.256 So 
Balkin and Siegel urge jurists to recapture the mechanisms by which Con-
gress and the Court worked together during the civil rights era to fulfill the 
original promise of the First Reconstruction.257  
Redemptive constitutionalism entails significant acts of constitutional 
borrowing, as a matter of both description and prescription. It recalls that 
during the civil rights era the Court often combated social stratification not 
solely through equality law itself, but also by guaranteeing individual liberty 
for all.258 Promoting egalitarianism through liberty had the advantage of re-
ducing the risk of backlash by dominant groups, members of which would 
also enjoy the benefits of increased protection against government. Yet pro-
tecting individual freedom nonetheless furthered the Reconstruction project 
of dismantling the racial caste system. For example, free speech doctrine 
imported the mechanism of strict scrutiny in early decisions that ensured the 
ability of the NAACP to protest civil rights abuses.259 Similarly, the Court 
resuscitated substantive due process, which had previously been associated 
with economic rights,260 in order to protect women’s autonomy and thereby 
guarantee their status as equal citizens.261 In these ways and others, the Court 
bridged the domains of liberty and equality to further an egalitarian vision 
of the Constitution.  
As for prescription, redemptive constitutionalism endorses what 
amounts to an assertive deployment of borrowing across domains of law 
associated with liberty and equality. Lawrence is of course the most promi-
nent recent example. As we noted above, and as Balkin and Siegel also 
appreciate, liberty models are attractive to gay rights advocates because they 
avoid forcing people to define themselves as members of an identity group 
in order to win protection.262 Sexual autonomy and criminal procedure are 
two other domains in which protecting individual liberty can work to dis-
mantle social stratification.263  
                                                                                                                      
 256. Id. at 97–99. 
 257. Id. at 93–95. Redemptive constitutionalism diverges from living constitutionalism, de-
spite its similar progressive orientation. At root, the former seeks, as its title suggests, to redeem—to 
revive and reinvigorate the egalitarian principles of the First and Second Reconstructions. In that 
respect, it may be closer to originalism than it is to living constitutionalism. Accordingly, in his most 
recent work, Jack Balkin has heartily endorsed many aspects of originalism. Balkin, supra note 240.  
 258. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 100.  
 259. See e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Although Balkin & Siegel do not cite 
Button or describe that specific instance of borrowing, the example is consonant with their more 
general description of the Warren Court’s attempt to protect the speech rights of the NAACP in 
order to further equality goals. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 90.  
 260. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 261. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 94. 
 262. Id. at 99–100. 
 263. Redemptive constitutionalism may also entail reworking equal protection law not by 
reference to liberty protections, but instead by means of devices taken from civil rights statutes. One 
way to invigorate equal protection, according to Balkin and Siegel, is to “borrow[]” from employ-
 
TEBBE & TSAI FINAL 2M.DOC 12/21/2009 1:26 PM 
February 2010] Constitutional Borrowing 519 
 
Our defense of borrowing therefore legitimates one judicial mechanism 
for implementing redemptive constitutionalism. Several of that theory’s pro-
posals may be achieved through the practice, as we have just shown. In this 
way, at least, the two projects resonate with one another.  
In another sense, however, spotlighting constitutional borrowing reveals 
a challenge for the redemptive project. The difficulty arises out of the rela-
tive agnosticism of the technique we have identified. For every act of 
importation that promises to revive the progressive potential of the First and 
Second Reconstructions, there is an available act that may retrench social 
stratification. One might wonder what will persuade courts to source their 
concepts from the redemptive tradition of American constitutionalism, 
which includes the achievements of the civil rights era, rather than the retro-
gressive tradition furthered by decisions such as the Civil Rights Cases,264 
City of Boerne,265 and Washington v. Davis.266 Nothing in our defense of the 
practice commands that sort of retrenchment, obviously, but nothing we 
have said prohibits it either. Such indeterminacy does not defeat redemptive 
constitutionalism’s agenda, but it does mean that the theory must give inde-
pendent reasons why judges should lift their ideas from redemptive domains 
of law rather than from retrogressive ones.  
E. Popular Constitutionalism 
Popular constitutionalism seems at first blush to have the least to learn 
from our treatment of constitutional borrowing. As it presents itself, 
that theory—or family of theories267—is concerned with the allocation of 
                                                                                                                      
ment and voting rights law the device of “mak[ing] more use of rebuttable presumptions when poli-
cies have significant disparate impact” on traditionally subordinated groups. Id. at 100–01. Of 
course, reviving disparate impact doctrine on the model of the Civil Rights Acts runs headlong into 
the problem of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which has itself been a source of judicial 
appropriation, as we have shown. See supra Section II.C. Redemptive constitutionalism purports to 
resolve that tension by proposing not that courts require defendants to remedy disparate impact, but 
instead that they fashion remedies that heighten political accountability by requiring lawmakers to 
justify publicly any effect that their enactments may have of reinforcing caste inequality in America. 
Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 101. 
Balkin and Siegel further urge courts to abandon the binary model of judicial scrutiny, which 
neatly divides authority between judges and legislatures, depending on whether the classification at 
issue draws strict scrutiny or not. Instead, they advocate Justice Marshall’s sliding-scale approach. 
Id. at 101 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 98–110 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting)). Presumably this change would affect several areas of constitutional doctrine 
via the borrowing mechanism. It dovetails with the observation we make above that the Court re-
cently has been distancing itself from the tiers-of-scrutiny framework altogether in one 
constitutional domain after another. See supra Section II.A. 
 264. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 265. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 266. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 267. Popular constitutionalism is perhaps most closely associated with Larry Kramer, but we 
are using the term to refer to a group of loosely related views. What they have in common is skepti-
cism toward the widespread assumption of judicial dominance over constitutional interpretation and 
enforcement. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 959, 
967–74 (2004) (describing varieties of living constitutionalism). 
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interpretive authority between the courts (and government as a whole) and 
the populace, not with specific discursive practices. According to popular 
constitutionalism, the role of the people in American governance does, and 
should, “include[] active and ongoing control over the interpretation and 
enforcement of constitutional law.”268 That project appears to sideline argu-
ments about whether and how judges should practice cross-pollination when 
they interpret the Constitution. 
Yet there are synergies between popular constitutionalism and the cus-
tom of borrowing. These points of convergence both provide helpful 
arguments for popular constitutionalists and suggest areas of future research 
for students of borrowing. Specifically, popular constitutionalism points out 
that the migration of ideas may well occur not only among judges and not 
only between judges and lawmakers, but also between lawyers and activists. 
Insofar as we are correct that constitutional ideas migrate outside adjudica-
tive and legislative processes, popular constitutionalists may gain an 
additional way to question the common assumption that judges ought to be 
given exclusive or final authority over the signification of constitutional 
provisions. For once we see that citizens and groups, too, can creatively re-
deploy readings of the Constitution, then judges have one less claim to a 
monopoly over its interpretation. We have mostly analyzed borrowing by 
jurists, but the same tools are readily wielded by nonspecialists. After all, 
one teaching of popular constitutionalism is that social actors can reclaim 
legal techniques that are ordinarily practiced by professionals. Our observa-
tion, if correct, would open up a promising area of inquiry into the practice 
of constitutional borrowing by “the people themselves.”  
The study of borrowing offers a more specific contribution as well, one 
that pertains to the normative claim of popular constitutionalism. Advocates 
of that theory argue not simply that interpretation of our basic law ought to 
take place among the people, but also that disputes over the meaning of the 
Constitution ought not to be settled finally by the Supreme Court.269 They 
seek to destabilize the assumption, widespread among Americans, that the 
Court’s word concerning the meaning of constitutional law ought to be 
paramount.270 
                                                                                                                      
Popular constitutionalism claims to be different from living constitutionalism—as we have de-
scribed it in Section IV.A.—in the sense that while the latter focuses on the ability of the people to 
alter or amend the Constitution, the former also describes and defends their power to engage in 
constitutional interpretation and enforcement. See id. at 961 n.3 (distinguishing Bruce Ackerman’s 
work from popular constitutionalism). 
 268. Id. at 959. One of us has advanced a theory according to which the development of a 
popular language is a core aspect of constitutionalism. See Tsai, supra note 11. 
 269. That stronger position is associated not only with Larry Kramer, but also arguably with 
Mark Tushnet and Sanford Levinson. Id. at 985. Representative works include Sanford Levinson, 
Constitutional Faith (1988); Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (2003); Mark 
Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement (1999); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: 
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 489 (2006). 
 270. Kramer, supra note 267, at 985. 
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We aim to intervene at a particular point in that argument. A common 
reason for giving final interpretive authority to the Court is that the nation 
needs to definitively resolve intractable legal disputes to reduce uncertainty 
and unpredictability. On this view, the Court occupies the best institutional 
position for providing a final determination.271 Defenders of popular consti-
tutionalism have responded by challenging the empirical claim that the 
Court does in fact provide better closure on controversial matters, as well as 
by pointing out that institutional design alone cannot determine whether 
courts deliver legal certainty.272 Examination of how these institutions actu-
ally function may yield surprisingly little evidence of any “settlement gap” 
between a system of judicial supremacy and more diffuse arrangements.273  
We have argued that the judicial practice of constitutional borrowing can 
bolster predictability and empowerment. If that is right, then our treatment 
of borrowing may open up a new line of argument for popular constitution-
alists, namely that nonjudicial actors are also capable of strategic leveraging 
and therefore that any claim of judicial distinctiveness in this regard may be 
overdrawn. When politicians, administrators, and advocates leverage 
mechanisms from one domain of constitutional law in some other area, they 
too promote rule-of-law values—just as effectively as judges. The notion 
that borrowing by nonjudges can enhance legal stability further weakens the 
claim that courts enjoy a peculiar institutional advantage in settling matters 
of constitutional importance. 
Furthermore, the synergy between popular constitutionalism and our 
study of borrowing suggests further research opportunities. In particular, it 
tees up an investigation of the social conditions most favorable to crossover 
attempts by nonjudicial actors as well as exploration into when these oppor-
tunities are bypassed. Such studies may illuminate the pragmatic 
considerations that motivate acts of borrowing, obstacles to their reception, 
and the microprocesses of conceptual change. Along the way, researchers 
could uncover the various ways in which popular and judicial borrowing 
inform one another.274 Who knows? Evidence of widespread borrowing 
could bolster or undercut our guardedly positive evaluation of its effects. 
                                                                                                                      
 271. Id. at 987; Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutional-
ism and Judicial Review, 234–35 & n.13 (2004) (citing Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997)). 
 272. Kramer, supra note 271, at 234; Kramer, supra note 267, at 987–88. 
 273. Kramer, supra note 267, at 987 (“[E]xperience suggests that if there is a ‘settlement gap’ 
between a world with judicial supremacy and a world without it, that gap is likely to be small.”). At 
least one scholar has argued that a judge’s role is to help sustain a level of “unsettlement” regarding 
the Constitution’s meanings. See Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution: A 
New Defense of Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2001). 
 274. Some studies have examined constitutional debate in this vein. See, e.g., Tsai, supra note 
11, at ch. 4 (juxtaposing civil rights advocates of the 1960s and social conservatives of the 1980s 
and showing how courts absorbed their mobilized discourse); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubor-
dination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470 
(2004); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-
Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 Duke L.J. 1641 (2008); Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: 
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Conclusion 
Constitutional borrowing is a historical fact. It is also alive and well to-
day, with persons of different ideological inclinations enlisting the technique 
on behalf of divergent legal arguments. Despite its prevalence, until now the 
practice has rarely received a sustained examination or defense. Here, we 
have defined constitutional borrowing, cataloged its various forms, justified 
the practice from a rule-of-law perspective, and offered some tools for cri-
tiquing particular acts of borrowing. We have argued that while borrowing is 
not an unalloyed good, it nevertheless often serves core rule-of-law values. 
And if we are correct that it is a defensible fixture of democratic constitu-
tionalism, then a number of theories of constitutional lawmaking should be 
reexamined. Accounts that can incorporate borrowing might do so by elabo-
rating the conditions under which borrowing is normatively desirable. 
Proponents of more mechanistic notions of judging ought to explain why 
borrowing is incompatible with their accounts and how, precisely, borrowing 
is to be avoided.  
We recognize that constitutional borrowing is a species of a broader 
phenomenon worthy of more fine-grained investigation. Appropriations oc-
cur throughout the law. Custodians of the law are constantly copying, 
adapting, and recycling ideas, frameworks, and heuristics. Looking ahead, it 
may be useful to consider what, if any, distinctive issues are raised when 
some kinds of borrowing are compared to others (say, importing from the 
common law or from statutes as opposed to appropriating from domestic 
constitutional law or foreign jurisdictions). Each of these projects would 
help jurists confront the reality that in our system of government, borrowing 
is the rule rather than the exception.  
                                                                                                                      
An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 363 (2008) (examining the social 
conditions under which presidential rhetoric led to judicial reversal over right of conscience and 
endorsement of prorights position). 
